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less mortal, than allowing another beachhead for the Communist movement in this part of the world.

In 1958 and 1959 and 1960, we allowed one such beachhead to be established in Cuba and become a source of mortal peril for all of us. The world was brought, in October 1962, closer to the brink of the ultimate war by that fact than we ever hope to come again.

As the efforts of the junta and the revolutionaries to seize power in the Dominican Republic teetered back and forth, order vanished. On Wednesday, April 28, the chief of police in Santo Domingo advised the American Ambassador that he could no longer guarantee the safety of the Embassy or of the thousands of Americans and other foreigners present on the island. At that critical juncture, the President of the United States, alone in the awesome responsibility which that office imposes upon its incumbent, had to make a decision. As he has himself said, delay itself would have been a decision—"a decision to risk and to lose the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of innocent people from all lands." His decision was unavoidable, and the promptness in making it may have been the reason that thousands of American homes are not today mourning the death of a loved one.

He ordered American forces into this chaotic situation, in order to save American lives. This they have done. And they have succeeded magnificently.

It was, indeed, unfortunate, as our Ambassador to the Organization of American States made clear, that there was not in being some peacekeeping force under the authority of the Organization of American States which could have been sent in to the Dominican Republic instead of U.S. forces alone.

The responsibilities in the situation, therefore, became apparent for the United States. Having taken action, we notified the Organization of American States as rapidly as possible and asked them to take responsibility for the peacekeeping operation. Our suggestion has now been approved.

In early morning hours of last Friday, after lengthy debate, by a vote of 14 to 5, with 1 abstention, the Organization of American States decided to take responsibility for keeping the peace in the Dominican Republic and to send in troops from the member nations for this purpose. It is hoped that when the military situation has been stabilized and peace restored, the Organization of American States within a year will be able to supervise free and open elections for the reestablishment of a democratic, responsible government in that troubled island.

As a member of the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, I believe the action of the Organization of American States setting up for the first time a peacekeeping force to fill a power vacuum in a Latin American country, to bring about stability and peace and to prevent a Communist takeover is, in itself, a real advance in Latin American affairs. Hopefully, this collective action will set a pattern for the future of working together to insure the security and independence of Latin American countries.

America's action in the Dominican Republic has brought sharp criticism from many areas throughout Latin America and may have given some additional impetus for the moment to Castro's anti-American offensive wherein he has most recently joined with others in calling our actions "gunboat diplomacy."

This was the risk our Government had to take, because the other alternative was much worse. In the long run, allowing the establishment of a new Communist country in Latin America would have given far more

impetus to communism and Castro, and the critics of the hour would have been far outweighed by the critics of history.

It is not the policy of this Government to dictate to the Dominican people the kind of a government they shall have. It is most emphatically not the purpose of the United States to shape the future of the Dominican Republic. And it is not the policy of this Government to allow agents of the Communist conspiracy to deny to the Dominican people their liberties and their hopes for progress and stability.

Most of the beginning revolutionaries, as newspaper accounts have made quite clear, and as our Government is fully aware, were not Communists or Communist sympathizers. On the contrary, most were motivated by hopes for a constitutional and democratic system under which their country could follow the quest for justice and progress—under which their fellow citizens could be free to hold and to voice their free judgments about their country's government.

Most of them were probably as bitterly opposed to a dictatorship of the left as they are to a dictatorship of the right—more bitterly opposed because a dictatorship of the Communist stripe would have the international support of other Communist countries.

Many of the more moderate revolutionaries soon recognized the increasing danger of a Communist takeover of the revolution and took refuge in foreign embassies. It was to protect them, as well as to protect Americans and other foreigners, that American troops are in the Dominican Republic.

But having gone in—having moved to prevent the betrayal of the Dominican revolution into the hands of the Communists—the United States and the other Republics of the hemisphere have a continuing responsibility there. We cannot now wash our hands of the Dominican Republic, and leave their liberties in the streets for the first opportunist to pick up.

President Johnson has stated our long-range hopes for this freedom-loving people most eloquently. Let me quote from him: "The road is open to you to share in building a Dominican democracy and we in America are ready and anxious and willing to help you. Your courage and your dedication are qualities which your country and all the hemisphere need for the future. You are needed to help shape that future. And neither we nor any other nation in this hemisphere can or should take upon itself to ever interfere with the affairs of your country or any other country. We believe that change comes and we are glad it does and it should come through peaceful process. But revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for hemisphere action only—repeat only—when the object is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship."

This latter statement is, I believe, the announcement of a new policy, or doctrine, which this country, hopefully with the aid of the Organization of American States, must firmly follow in the future as firmly as it has been announced.

We seek only peace and self-determination for the peoples of the Dominican Republic and of Latin America. We do not seek domination or dominion. Again, the President has made this clear. He said:

"The form and the nature of the free Dominican Government is, I assure you, solely a matter for the Dominican people, but we do know what kind of government we hope to see in the Dominican Republic. For that is carefully spelled out in the treaty and the agreements which make up the fabric of the inter-American system. It is expressed, time and time again, in the words of our states-

men and the values and hopes which bind us all together.

"We hope to see a government freely chosen by the will of all the people.

"We hope to see a government dedicated to social justice for every citizen.

"We hope to see a government working, every hour of every day, to feeding the hungry, to educating the ignorant, to healing the sick—a government whose only concern is the progress and the elevation and the welfare of all the people."

In these words of the President of the United States there is a prescription, not for the discredited techniques of so-called gunboat diplomacy, not for the condescension and proprietary attitude which once tarnished our country's image in this, our immediate neighborhood, but for a policy in which the combined power of all the Americas—military power where necessary, economic power, and above all, moral power, will be utilized to preserve freedom and to encourage progress, and to seek justice for all Americans and for all the Americas.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Florida yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Does the Senator from Florida yield to the Senator from Oklahoma?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield.

Mr. HARRIS. I am pleased that I was in the Chamber to hear the remarks made by the distinguished Senator from Florida on the situation in the Dominican Republic, as I was a few weeks ago when he spoke so lucidly on the same subject in a speech which was partly the inspiration for the one I made in Tulsa, Okla., which the Senator has been so kind as to have printed in the Record.

I compliment the Senator from Florida on his statement today, and for the statements he has made concerning the situation in Latin America, and particularly in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. SMATHERS. I am grateful to the Senator for his statements.

FG UN Clark  
SENATOR CHURCH'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, Senator Church has been one of the most outspoken public figures in advocating thoughtful consideration and debate about American objectives in Vietnam. On April 22, I inserted an article by the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Church), entitled "We Should Negotiate a Settlement in Vietnam," in the Congressional Record. Several editorials have appeared recently commending Senator Church for speaking out on Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent to have two of these editorials inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Idaho Observer, Apr 15, 1965]  
PRESIDENT "GOES TO CHURCH" IN VIETNAM

President Johnson's diplomatic "escalation" of the war in Vietnam has brightened the prospect of a political solution short of the full-scale ground war toward which the United States was headed a few short weeks ago, and it has thereby placed the United States on stronger ground in Southeast Asia. But it may not be enough to avert a debacle.

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In stating for the first time that the United States attaches no preconditions to negotiation with Hanoi or Peking, the President moved the Vietnamese dispute toward the conference table, where we have some chance of improving our position, and away from the battlefield, where our prospects are slim indeed. The question now is whether the Communists will choose to risk at the conference table the advantage we have given them in the field.

In holding forth his offer of economic aid to develop all of southeast Asia, the President put our policy in perspective once again, reminding the world, and perhaps also his countrymen, of the constructive purpose which, after all, underlies our presence in Vietnam. Our military ventures in recent weeks have all but obscured that purpose and at times have seemed to replace it. Whether or not the Communists may elect to join us in this enterprise, the President's plan offers the only sound route toward the political stability and independence which should be our objective in southeast Asia.

The President has turned in the right direction, but he may not have gone far enough.

The conference door has been opened, but the Communists are unlikely to enter so long as the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam continue to vindicate the Communist cause, to cement their inner antagonisms and to goad them toward a massive military response with which we would be hard put to deal.

The economic door has been opened, but little will come of that until the United States begins to put its full weight into the long, hard, and expensive undertaking.

The political door has been opened, but the U.S. public, still largely deluded by the vain quest for a final military answer, must yet learn to live with compromise and accommodation. U.S. policymakers still must grope their way toward a workable and enforceable political arrangement which will safeguard our interests, as well as the interests of others, in southeast Asia. This will be no easy task.

But a start has been made. Perhaps he did so too late, but the President at last has put his seal of approval on a policy which makes sense. It is essentially the same policy for which others, including Idaho's Senator FRANK CHURCH, have been denounced as heretics because they had the foresight to grasp it earlier and the courage to speak up for it.

S.H.D.

[From the Emmett (Idaho) Messenger-Index, Apr. 15, 1965]

Voice of Disaster

One measure of democracy's strength is the freedom of its citizens to speak out—to dissent from the popular view.

So says a footnote to the Saturday Evening Post's biweekly feature, "Speaking Out," and it is a truism that can never be overemphasized in a society where conformity is at once its strength and its greatest weakness.

In the April 24 issue of the Post, Idaho's senior Senator FRANK CHURCH pursued his conviction that "we should negotiate a settlement in Vietnam." He marshals powerful logic to support the view that our deepening involvement in the Vietnam war will have the ultimate effect of extending Communist China's influence through southeast Asia.

The Senator contends that steadily increasing strikes to the north can only drive North Vietnam into Peking's arms, which it now loathes, and may eventually bring Chinese armies in a Korea-type war involving tens or hundreds of thousands of casualties instead of hundreds.

He says only the South Vietnam people themselves can win or lose what essentially is a civil war, and that although we have invested some prestige there, the struggle

by no stretch of the imagination can threaten the life of our country.

The article merits thoughtful and careful reading.

In the Vietnam matter, Senator CHURCH has no illusions about his being the voice of dissent. He knows that the popular view does not now support his deeply held convictions, and rumor has it that his speaking out has brought down on his head the wrath of the President.

History may never record with certainty whether Senator CHURCH is right or wrong, for the sweep of events, in whatever direction they take, invariably find their own rationalization and their own justification. The schoolboy can find no indictment in the history books. If American policy ever has been misguided or short-sighted, the lone voices that rose in timely dissent have long since been muted and lost to all but the careful scholar.

But this is not to say that timely dissent is without influence. It often speaks with greater power than the bland voice of popular conformity, for it speaks from the deep force of conviction that conformance often finds missing.

It already has become apparent that Senator CHURCH's voice of dissent has exerted powerful influence over national policy. In his recent "unconditional discussions" speech, the President has adopted a position advocated by Senator CHURCH all along, whether or not L.B.J. is willing to concede any credit to F.C.

It is likely, indeed, that in his courage to speak out strongly with a minority view, Senator CHURCH has done more than any man in the United States, including the President, to clarify our perspective of the complex entanglement in Vietnam.

If because of this the President is displeased with Senator CHURCH, it is a discredit to the President and not to the senior Senator from Idaho.

A man whose integrity clings to fully considered convictions in the face of majority opposition is a man of great courage. If at the same time he speaks out in reasoned dissent, he influences the headlong and sometimes heedless rush of history.

Senator CHURCH's dissent already is vindicated. Time might well prove that his lone voice has been a critical factor in turning America away from disaster.

And time also might show that if the Senator remains steadfast, the Presidential displeasure will be transformed into greater respect and admiration.

MR. CLARK. My own view is that the Senator from Idaho has had a very real influence in the modification of our foreign policy in Vietnam. I commend him for his earnest efforts in the cause of peace.

#### HENRY J. TASCA NAMED AS AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO

MR. CLARK. Mr. President, I am happy to call to the attention of the Senate the fact that President Johnson has appointed Henry J. Tasca, of Philadelphia, to be our Ambassador to Morocco.

Mr. Tasca is a loyal alumnus of South Philadelphia High School, and attended Temple University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the London School of Economics.

It is greatly to Mr. Tasca's credit to note that this 11th of 11 children is the son of an immigrant tailor who came to Philadelphia from the Umbrian region of Italy many years ago.

I am happy indeed to note the fine career of this distinguished Philadel-

phian; and I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin for April 25, 1965, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

New Envoy to Morocco Is Loyal South Philadelphia Graduate

(By Anthony Day, Bulletin Washington bureau)

WASHINGTON, April 24.—The career diplomat President Johnson has chosen to be his new Ambassador to Morocco is a passionately loyal alumnus of South Philadelphia High School.

It was at the school (class of 1930) that the President's nominee, Henry J. Tasca, the 11th of an immigrant tailor's 11 children, learned 3 elements of a diplomat's education: languages, chess, and democracy.

He later studied economics at Temple University, the University of Pennsylvania and the London School of Economics. Add to this acquired knowledge a natural talent for persuasive reasoning, a vigorous constitution, imposing looks and a gentle manner, and you have the formula that made a successful diplomat of a poor boy from South Philadelphia.

#### TRIBUTE TO AMERICA

Tasca, 48, is unabashedly proud of his rise from an obscure origin to a high rank in the foreign service of the United States. He is now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He expects to go to Rabat, Morocco, in about 6 weeks, after the Senate confirms his appointment as Ambassador.

"It is a great tribute to America that the son of an immigrant can go as an Ambassador to an important country," he said yesterday.

Tasca was born in Providence, R.I. His father, Julius, and his mother, Philomena, came to the United States in the 1880's from the Adriatic coast of Italy across the peninsula from Rome.

#### LIVES ON SOUTH 17TH STREET

Julius Tasca brought his family to Philadelphia when Henry Tasca was 7. They settled in a house at 1630 South 17th Street, and lived there during most of the Tasca's boyhood. Several brothers and sisters still live in the Philadelphia area.

The father died when Henry Tasca was 11. The boy went to Vare Junior High School, then to South Philadelphia High. Summers he worked, part of the time he cut cloth at a clothing factory near 7th and Arch Streets.

At the big high school—it was the old building—Tasca excelled in Latin, winning a gold medal for his excellence in the language. (Now he is fluent in German, French, and Italian.)

As for chess—"I think chess is a great thing for any diplomat," he said. "Just as in chess, there is much in diplomacy that demands a very clear notion of consequences. You have to look ahead."

#### SOUTH PHILLY DEMOCRACY

The South Philadelphia variety of democracy has Tasca's total allegiance. "It was a great time, a wonderful time," he said as he recalled how the student body was a harmonious mixture of many nationalities.

"We Americans are made in our junior high schools and high schools," he said. "Other people do not understand us until they understand that. We learn in our schools that we've got to be fair. We learn to live together."

After obtaining advanced degrees—and publishing two books on international trade—Tasca spent the war years in the Navy as an economic specialist in U.S. military government. He played an important part in establishing European monetary poli-

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variety of ways to achieve a common solution of their common problems.

Interlocal contracting, for example, is authorized, and the use of multipurpose metropolitan districts is encouraged.

Further, the legislature's authority to deal with urban area problems is fully protected.

These provisions, however, should be regarded as only beginnings, for there is a clear need for more adequate State leadership and attention with respect to your metropolitan problems. The State, after all, is the depository for most of the legal power to act in urban affairs, and it must come to accept a genuine role in the field.

I'm still enough of a Hamiltonian, however, to believe the Federal Government also has a special role to play in helping civic institutions adapt to their new regional environment.

The national character of many metropolitan questions makes this mandatory. More than 50 Federal programs are now operating in our urban areas, and most of them have been enacted since 1950. The future is not likely to reverse this trend.

Authority and effort are needed in Washington—as well as in the urban areas—to assure that each of these programs contributes not only to its more limited program goal, but also to the general goals of our emerging metropolitan communities. Three current case studies indicate that Washington is responding to this challenge.

The proposed Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1965 (which I introduced this year and which 39 Senators cosponsored), is of paramount importance to you here and to all other metropolitan regions in the country. Last month, we held a week of hearings on this measure.

Title IV of this bill merits your special consideration, since it establishes a national urban assistance policy. Under it, each Federal executive administering urban programs is obliged to coordinate his actions with those of other Federal agencies and his plans must be part of or consistent with local and area-wide planning efforts.

Another section of this title stipulates that applications for grants and loans under certain urban programs would be reviewed and commented upon—but not vetoed—by a regional planning body composed of elected officials from the general units of local government. This section is designed to strengthen areawide planning and to assist Federal agencies in their evaluation of grant applications.

It will not create undue delays. But it will protect the integrity of regional planning objectives from subversion by a fragmented and uncoordinated Federal approach to urban development. Equally important, it helps to implement one of the basic goals of this conference and of your forum.

A second case study of Federal responses to urban problems is covered in the proposed Water Quality Act of 1965, which I was privileged to introduce in this session. The bill has now passed both Houses of Congress. It increases grants for the construction of municipal sewage treatment works and provides financial assistance to municipalities and other bodies for the separation of combined sewers. Of special concern to you is the provision that the grants may be increased by 10 percent for projects which are part of a comprehensive regional plan. This incentive approach has worked well in the "open space" program. It will strengthen our attempt to curb water pollution. And I am convinced that this device should be extended to other Federal programs.

A third proposal would create a broad instrument for dealing with the urban crisis at both the national and the grass roots levels. I have cosponsored President Johnson's bill to establish a Department of Housing and Urban Development.

I believe this legislation is needed to improve the administration and coordination of the principal Federal programs which provide assistance for the housing and the development of the Nation's urban communities.

I am convinced that it will help promote interstate, regional and metropolitan collaboration.

I am certain that such a department will provide better technical assistance and information—including a clearinghouse service—to these units of local and State government.

No one of these three national proposals alone will solve the urban crisis, nor will State and local efforts alone suffice. But when combined, they offer meaningful ways of implementing the concept of "creative federalism" and of giving local officials a better than even chance of establishing the foundations of a vital metropolitan community.

The town was once the place where many public decisions were made and carried out. Then it was the city. Now it is the region, with its combination of cities and towns. These developments have not been sudden—for as Vachel Lindsay wrote of Springfield, Ill.:

"Record it for the grandsons of your son—  
A city is not built in a day:  
A little town cannot complete her soul  
Till countless generation pass away."

## VIETNAM DEBATE: DEMOCRACY AT WORK

Mr. PROXIMIRE. Mr. President, the debate over our policies in Vietnam reached a crescendo on Saturday here in Washington. For many, many hours some of the most vigorous critics of our Asian policies disputed with some eminent academic defenders of the administration course.

Perhaps the show ran a little too long. Some of the presentations were uninformed, some intemperate; but a surprising number were incisive and penetrating.

Obviously all of this causes pain to those who would like to see this Nation united 1,000 percent behind the President on Vietnam. But, let us face it, there is a serious division in America on this immensely perplexing and complex issue, as there is bound to be in a big, thinking, working democracy.

The importance of this teach-in is that the processes of democracy were constructively at work on this troublesome problem. In view of the radio and educational television audience of hundreds of thousands, and since millions of Americans must have read newspaper reports of this discussion, our democracy has been more deeply informed.

Although McGeorge Bundy—who was to have been the administration's No. 1 defender was necessarily on assignment in Santo Domingo, the administration's case was vigorously and competently expressed. In my judgment the administration position was significantly strengthened by this discussion.

I ask unanimous consent that a report of the debate in Sunday's New York Times, together with identification of the principal participants be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, May 16, 1965]

VIETNAM DEBATE HEARD ON 100 CAMPUSES—  
BUNDY Is UNABLE To APPEAR BECAUSE OF  
"OTHER DUTIES"

(By Max Frankel)

WASHINGTON, May 15.—The great debate lost its star performer in midcourse today when Government business kept McGeorge Bundy at the White House and away from a national audience watching a teach-in on Vietnam policy.

Mr. Bundy, special assistant to President Johnson for national security affairs and one of the principal architects of American foreign policy, announced his withdrawal at the start of the main debate of the all-day program.

An audience of about 5,000 persons had assembled here from many parts of the country to witness the confrontation between Mr. Bundy and some of his best known critics in the academic world. More than 100,000 other persons gathered at more than 100 campuses to hear the debate by way of special radio hookups.

Word of the cancellation came in the 2-hour lunch recess. When the meeting gathered again for the major debate session, much of the audience was still unaware that Mr. Bundy would not speak.

The announcement was greeted by a few scattered boos and hisses, mixed with desultory applause. There was also some laughter, but the statement as a whole brought a round of gentle applause at its conclusion.

There was no explanation from the White House for Mr. Bundy's absence. The sponsors of the debate withheld comment. They were told informally that the reasons for his absence would become clear in 2 or 3 days.

There were no overt signs of crisis around the Government. President Johnson issued a brief statement offering aid to a coalition government in the Dominican Republic, read another statement on excise tax policy, and planned to spend the weekend at the nearby presidential retreat at Camp David, Md.

Senior officials of the administration said that they had strict orders not even to hint at the reason for Mr. Bundy's cancellation. They said they were uncomfortable with the need for silence and expressed hope that developments today or tomorrow would demonstrate the need for the sudden cancellation.

Prof. Robert Scalapino of the University of California at Berkeley, a member of the panel that supported Mr. Bundy, took his place as the main debater in defense of administration policy.

Mr. Bundy's statement said that "other duties," which he did not specify, had forced him to miss a meeting that he had looked forward to. He said he disagreed wholly with those who believed it inappropriate for a Government official to face his critics.

"I take comfort in the thought that I shall miss the meeting more than you will miss me," he added.

But he was missed. The academic sponsors had said from the start that Mr. Bundy's submission to questioning and criticism had "made the event."

He was also missed because he had been counted upon to provide authoritative and official interpretations of Government actions and policies that have been the target of scholarly attack in the dozens of teach-ins that led to the debate today.

He had warned the sponsors of the teach-in that he might not be able to take part. The sponsors confirmed this.

In Mr. Bundy's absence, the burden of defense fell to some of the leading scholars and analysts of foreign affairs who had assembled to interrogate and help him.

Their discussion was often sharp, but never unruly. It was accompanied by many appeals for courtesy and respect and many statements that the problem of Vietnam was

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so complex as to permit serious differences among thoughtful and honest men.

Prof. George McT. Kahin, who was to have been Mr. Bundy's principal opponent, asserted the theme of the teach-ins—that the American public was entitled to "full and honest answers"—and questioned the administration's readiness to supply those answers at all times.

## URGES TIE TO NATIONALISM

But Mr. Kahin's principal target was policy. He bemoaned the U.S. "consistent failure" and "inability both to appreciate the importance of Asian nationalism and to work with, rather than against, that powerful force."

A leading American student of southeast Asia, Professor Kahin said that Western policies had driven nationalists throughout Asia toward the Communist camp because the Communists had recognized the nationalists' aspiration. He argued that, for this reason, no military victory was possible in Vietnam, no independent nation of South Vietnam was ever likely to achieve popularity and viability, and the American effort to contain the expansion of Communist China was misdirected against North Vietnam.

He also argued against the so-called "domino theory," which holds that the loss of all Vietnam to communism would cause the loss of other nations as well.

"So long as southeast Asia governments are in harmony with their countries' nationalism, and so long as they are wise enough to meet the most pressing economic and social demands of their peoples, they are not likely to succumb to communism," he said.

He said that the administration, although it had offered "unconditional" discussions, was in fact demanding that the Vietcong rebels immediately cease all operations and that South Vietnam continue its separate existence "in permanent violation" of the Geneva accord of 1954, and was also refusing to deal with the Vietcong's political arm, the National Liberation Front.

The bombing of North Vietnam is more likely to stiffen that Government's resistance than persuade it to undertake negotiations, Professor Kahin said.

## BACKED BY AUDIENCE

Mr. Kahin spoke deliberately and without fire. Although his views plainly had the support of most of the audience, he drew his first applause at the very end of his prepared text, when he said:

"When the American public faces the prospect of war, it has the right to full and honest answers."

He was applauded a second time when he appended a statement that he had hoped "Mr. Bundy's appearance would be an indication of a change in the administration's attitude as to the value of informed public opinion."

"I can only hope that his indispensability in meeting some major crisis of policy making is really of greater importance than the contribution he might have made this afternoon," he said.

Following Mr. Kahin, Professor Scalapino said that the Vietcong were unquestionably not an indigenous force. He cited statements in the Peiping press attributing the success of the Vietcong to the Marxist-Leninist leadership of a Marxist-Leninist force.

## DIFFER OVER TACTICS

While there have been differences between Hanoi and the leaders of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, these are differences over tactics and not over basic policy, Dr. Scalapino said.

The strength of the Vietcong is primarily due to organizational skills that do not necessarily mean it has public support, he went on. He said he was confident that the people of South Vietnam, if they were able to

express themselves in free elections, would not vote for the National Liberation Front.

Peiping has steadily contended that "U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger" that would collapse when pushed, he said. "If Peiping is able to demonstrate this works in South Vietnam, it will work elsewhere," Dr. Scalapino declared.

The speaker said this did not mean that he subscribed to the so-called domino theory. Rather, he said he would use the word "checkers"—because the Communists would "jump to those areas which they can neutralize."

If the United States is to negotiate with Hanoi and the Vietcong, he said, it should regard them as Communists and should not operate under the illusion that it is dealing with Asian nationalism.

Mr. Bundy made a brief contribution to the debate by sending "only a word" about the administration's purpose in Vietnam.

"That purpose is peace," he said, "for the people of Vietnam, the people of southeast Asia and the people of the United States.

"We evidently differ on the choice of ways and means to peace, in what we all must recognize to be a complex, ugly and demanding situation. Those differences may go deep to the nature of the politics of Asia, to the legitimacy of force in the face of armed attack and to the true prospects and purposes of the people of Vietnam themselves."

But Mr. Bundy suggested that "what divides us is less than what unites us."

## ALL SEEK "DECENT" ACCORD

"None of us wants the war to be enlarged," he said. "All of us want a decent settlement. None of us wants other men to be forced under a totalitarian political authority. All of us seek a solution in which American troops can be honorably withdrawn. None of us—I hope—believes that these are easy goals."

Mr. Bundy praised the arrangements for the debate as "fair to a fault" and said the American people knew that the real day of danger would come when the Nation was afraid of any unpopular minority or unwilling to reply to its voices.

He said there was some ground for arguing that such debate would encourage the Nation's adversaries. The Chinese Communists will continue to pretend, he said, that the protest of 700 faculty members weakens American policy. However, Americans know that the protests come only from a "small minority" of teachers and students, he said.

A greater tribute to the protest movement was expressed by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., former Harvard professor and White House aid. He had been billed as a defender of administration policy in Vietnam and did praise what he said were President Johnson's efforts to reach a peaceful settlement.

But he brought some discomfort to both sides.

He said it was "moving and impressive" to see the deep national concern that had produced the meeting today. And he deplored "a certain selfrighteousness" that he felt had crept into utterances on all sides of the discussion.

Mr. Schlesinger was particularly severe with Secretary of State Dean Rusk for a comment that some educators suffered from "guiltiness." He said that, after reading the administration's white paper on Vietnam, he had been tempted to reflect upon the guiltiness of Secretaries of State.

But he also deplored the use of slogans and bright phrases in the academic world in dealing with a complicated problem.

## CALLS FOR NEGOTIATION

Mr. Schlesinger argued that, although the commitment to defend South Vietnam in 1954 was probably a mistake, policymakers today could not withdraw from that commitment without undermining other Asian nations, abandoning loyal supporters in

South Vietnam and giving comfort to Peiping in its conflict with Moscow.

Negotiation is the only answer, he said, adding that he understood the administration was trying to force North Vietnam to the conference table.

He did not agree, he said, with the heavy emphasis upon military solutions, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam. He said that Washington's commitment to South Vietnam and its desire to demonstrate that the Vietcong could not win the guerrilla war could be better achieved through a limited increase in American ground forces there and a more attractive political program.

"If we took the marines we now have in the Dominican Republic and sent them to South Vietnam, we'd be a good deal better off in both countries," he said.

Mr. Schlesinger appeared on a morning program of speeches with Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago and Isaac Deutscher, the writer on Marxism.

## PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEBATE

WASHINGTON, May 15—These were the principal participants in today's national teach-in about United States policy in Vietnam:

## MORNING SPEECHES

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., on the Government position.

Hans J. Morgenthau, a critique of the administration.

Isaac Deutscher on the policy and the cold war.

Eric Wolf, moderator, on the history of the teach-in.

## AFTERNOON POLICY CONFRONTATION

## Speakers

George McT. Kahin, professor of government and director of the southeast Asia program, Cornell University.

## Interrogators

## On behalf of U.S. policy:

Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of public law and government and director, Research Institute for Communist Affairs, Columbia University.

Wesley R. Fishel, professor of political science, Michigan State University.

Robert A. Scalapino, professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley.

Michael F. M. Lindsay, professor of Far Eastern studies, American University.

## Against U.S. policy:

Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science and director, Center and Study of American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago.

Stanley Millett, professor of government, Brarlcliff College.

Mary Wright, professor of history, Yale University.

William A. Williams, professor of history, University of Wisconsin.

## Moderator

Ernest Nagel, professor of philosophy, Columbia University.

## EVENING PANEL DISCUSSIONS

## The realities of North Vietnam

## For U.S. policy:

P. J. Honey, British scholar on Vietnamese affairs.

Paul Kattenberg, policy planning staff, State Department.

## Against U.S. policy:

Bernard Fall, Howard University.

## The issue of Chinese expansion

## For U.S. policy:

Benjamin Schwartz, Harvard.

Michael Lindsey, American University.

Lindsay Grant, Far East Division, State Department.

## Against U.S. policy:

Felix Greene, Palo Alto.

Mary Wright, Yale.

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*The domino theory in southeast Asia*  
For U.S. policy:

Robert Scalapino, University of California, Berkeley.

Herbert Spivack, Examination Board, U.S. Foreign Service.

Against U.S. policy:

Oliver Clubb, Jr., Syracuse.

Daniel Lev, Cornell.

*The U.S. record in South Vietnam*

For U.S. policy:

Wesley Fishel, Michigan State.

Thomas Conlon, Far East Affairs, State Department.

Against U.S. policy:

Nicholas Wahl, Princeton.

Stanley Millet, Briarcliff.

*The civil war and aggression from the North*

For U.S. policy:

Robert Scigliano, Michigan State.

William J. Jorden, Public Affairs Division, State Department.

Against U.S. policy:

Robert Browne, Farleigh Dickinson.

Robert Scheer Center for Study of Democratic Institutions.

*U.S. military policy*

For U.S. policy:

Leo Cherne, International Rescue Committee.

John Huizinga, policy planning council, State Department.

Against U.S. policy:

Seymour Melman, Columbia.

Anatol Rappaport, Michigan.

*Can the war be won?*

For U.S. policy:

Col. Amos Jordan, U.S. Military Academy, West Point.

Daniel Ellsberg, State Department.

Against U.S. policy:

Jason Finkle, University of Southern California.

Walter Goldstein, Brooklyn College.

*Political and moral effects of U.S. policy*

For U.S. policy:

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia, and Joseph J. Sisco, International Organization Affairs, State Department.

Against U.S. policy:

Isaac Deutscher.

Staughton Lynd, Yale.

*The making of U.S. policy*

For U.S. policy:

Walt W. Rostow, chairman, Policy Planning Council, State Department.

Paul Seabury, University of California, Berkeley.

Samuel Huntington, Harvard.

Against U.S. policy:

D. F. Fleming, California State College.

Mark Raskin, Institute for Policy Studies.

Stanley Hoffman, Harvard.

Hans Morgenthau.

**Mr. PROXMIRE.** Mr. President, Mr. James Reston, of the New York Times, has made a characteristically thoughtful analysis of this debate, calling it useful and adding that it "may have set an important precedent for the future." I ask that this Reston analysis be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the analysis was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,  
May 16, 1965]

WASHINGTON: AN ENTERPRISING DEBATE

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, May 15.—Something new and enterprising has happened in the National Capital this weekend. The political and intellectual communities of the Nation have come together and engaged in a serious and

responsible debate on the policy of the United States in Vietnam.

President Johnson was originally against this erudite confrontation. He took the opposition on the campuses of the country to his Vietnam policy as another act of high-brow hostility to him personally. Finally, he agreed to let his principal White House adviser on foreign policy, W. McGeorge Bundy, former dean of the Harvard faculty, address the visiting professors and students; but, in the end, Mr. Bundy didn't show.

BUNDY SCRATCHED

Nevertheless, despite Mr. Bundy's regrettable and unexplained absence, the exchange of ideas in the meeting was useful and may have set an important precedent for the future.

This was not merely a protest by the students and professors about what is happening there—though their previous protests brought it about—but an inquiry, an honest search for answers to the moral, political and military dilemmas that confront the country in southeast Asia.

Most important, it was a model of what can be accomplished in a vast, democratic continental society, when modern instruments of communication are used to discuss fundamental questions of public policy.

It was not only that hundreds of students and professors gathered here to express their concern about the Johnson administration's policy in Vietnam, or that representatives of the administration explained at last what the Government was doing there, but that the whole discussion was carried by radio to university communities in 35 States and thus enabled the students to continue the discussion in the coming days and weeks.

NO RESOLUTION

This is something quite new and different from the struggles between governments and universities in other countries. The energy and zeal of university students elsewhere are usually directed either against the Government, as in many Latin-American countries, or as an instrument of Government propaganda in many Communist and newly developed countries, but the interuniversity meeting here in Washington this weekend provided an opportunity to find the truth between the policies of the Government and the conflicting views of its critics.

Nothing was really resolved in the process, but an important technique of serious discussion was discovered.

Presidential talks in the past have not produced objective national discussion of political realities. The press and radio and television have merely dramatized the differences of opinion over policy. The political debates in Congress have only encouraged partisan and subjective conclusions about how to proceed. And, until this weekend, the demonstrations on the American campuses have provoked more heat than light.

BALANCED DEBATE

The debate here in Washington this weekend, however, has been more balanced and realistic. The Administration, which at first was aloof, full of resentment and self-pity, finally participated in the discussion and helped itself and its critics to deal with realities in the process.

Even so, this debate between the intellectual and political communities of the country is still unsatisfactory. It is still dealing primarily with the effects of the disorder of the world and not with the causes. Vietnam, which was the main subject of this weekend's discussion, is not a cause but merely one effect of the problem.

The cause is the poverty, misery, and resentment of most of the human race and the exploitation of these things by the cunning techniques of Communist subversion. Another cause is the failure of the Western World to devise effective means of dealing with these facts.

China is now the central problem. It has a grievance, an atomic bomb, a religious ideology and a staggering surplus of people. In Asia it is the arsenal of rebellion, and the problem is how to deal with this astounding fact.

China is using the scientific achievements of the West to defy the West—as it did this past week with its explosion of another atomic device. The most dangerous thing in the world today is that the West has found no means to deal with this rising problem and the university professors and students are quite right in recognizing that no government has come up with the answer.

DISCUSSING REALITIES

The importance of this weekend's debate in Washington is that at least a means has been found to discuss these realities, to move from protest against the effects of world disorder to analysis of causes and a choice of hard options.

The interuniversity committee, which was responsible for the Washington teach-in, should be continued and supported financially. It started at the University of Michigan as a protesting movement against the Government's Vietnamese policy, threatening an academic strike, and has now developed into a forum of national debate which could be of fundamental importance to the Nation.

**Mr. PROXMIRE.** Mr. President, on Monday, the New York Times carried substantial excerpts from this national teach-in and I ask unanimous consent that these excerpts be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, May 17, 1965]  
EXCERPTS FROM NATIONAL TEACH-IN ON VIETNAM POLICY AND TEXT OF BUNDY STATEMENT

(Note.—Following are excerpts from the transcript of the national teach-in on Vietnam in Washington Saturday as recorded by the New York Times.)

(Moderator Ernest Nagel, professor of philosophy at Columbia University.)

Ladies and gentlemen, I have a very important announcement to read. I've been requested to read to you a text of a statement by Mr. McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to President Johnson):

I greatly regret that it is impossible for me to take part in the discussion this afternoon of our policy in Vietnam.

I have looked forward to this meeting and I hate to miss it. When I accepted your invitation, I did so with a warning that I might be unable to attend because of other duties. It gives me no pleasure that this warning has come true.

I regret my absence the more because I wholly disagree with those who have argued that it is inappropriate for a Government official to take part in a discussion of this kind.

It may be true, although I have no firsthand knowledge that some of your meetings on Vietnam have failed to meet the standards appropriate to university and college discussions. It may also be true, and I have thought so once or twice myself that a few of those who feel strongly about the situation in Vietnam have been more interested in pressure upon the administration than in fair discussion with its representatives.

But the preliminary arrangements for this particular meeting, so far as I have knowledge of them, have been fair to a fault. I'm confident the discussion this afternoon will be a model of its kind.

Share deep interest

Members of the academic community and members of the administration share a deep interest in the encouragement of such fair and open discussion. It has been argued that debate of this kind should be avoided

because it can give encouragement to the adversaries of our country. There is some ground for this argument, since it is true that Communists have little understanding of the meaning of debate in a free society. The Chinese will continue to pretend, and perhaps in part to believe, that American policy is weaker because 700 faculty members have made a protest against our policy in Vietnam.

The American people, whatever their opinions, know better. They know that those who are protesting are only a minority, indeed a small minority, of American teachers and students. They know also that even within that minority the great majority accept and respect the rights and duty of the American administration to meet its constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The American people know that the real day of danger will come when we are afraid of any unpopular minority or unwilling to reply to its voices. They understand what Communists cannot understand at all: That open discussion between our citizens and their government is the central nervous system of our free society. We cannot let the propaganda of totalitarians divert us from our necessary arguments with one another, any more than we should let them be misled by such debates if we can help it.

I will not take your time in this brief message for a rehearsal of the policy of this administration on Vietnam. Let me take only a word to speak of our purpose here—our purpose there. That purpose is peace for the people of Vietnam, the people of southeast Asia, and the people of the United States.

We evidently differ on the choice of ways and means to peace, in what we all must recognize to be a complex, ugly, and demanding situation. Those differences may go deep to the nature of the politics of Asia, to the legitimacy of the force in the face of armed attack and to the true prospects and purposes of the people of Vietnam themselves.

#### No easy goals

But my own assessment is that what divides us is less than what unites us. None of us wants the war to be enlarged. All of us want a decent settlement. None of us wants other men to be forced under a totalitarian political authority. All of us seek a solution in which American troops can be honorably withdrawn. None of us, I hope, believes that these are easy goals. All of us, I trust, are prepared to be steadfast in the pursuit of our purposes.

I recognize the entire sincerity of the great majority of those who now disagree with our policy in Vietnam. I think many of these critics have been wrong in earlier moments of stress and danger and I think many of them misunderstand the hard realities of this dangerous world. But their good faith and good intent are not in question, and on other issues at other times their efforts have been of great service to the country.

Having said this much, perhaps I can ask you in return that these critics should recognize that the administration, which now bears responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, does not admire force for its own sake, or brinkmanship of any sort. The purpose of its foreign policy in Vietnam as elsewhere is that diplomacy and power and progress and hope shall be held together in the service of the freedom of us all.

So I trust that the discussion this afternoon will not turn upon charge and counter-charge against the motives of those with whom we disagree.

Let it turn, instead, upon analysis of the situation as it is, and of choices for the future which can serve the purposes we share.

I repeat my apologies for my forced absence; and I take comfort in the thought that I shall miss the meeting more than you will miss me.

#### RULES TO GOVERN PROCEEDINGS

Mr. NAGEL. In view of this statement from Mr. Bundy some changes will have to be made in the program for this afternoon and I will mention that presently.

My role as moderator imposes upon me the obligation to say only what is essential and to say it briefly. I will therefore limit the introductory remarks to stating what I believe to be the objective of this meeting and to mentioning the simple rules that will govern these proceedings.

This meeting has come into being because of widespread doubt in many academic communities as well as elsewhere concerning the wisdom of current United States policy in Vietnam. It needs to be emphasized, however, that the meeting has been sponsored by university teachers throughout the country and organized by the Inter-University Committee for a Public Hearing on Vietnam on the basis of two assumptions:

The first is that whether or not those doubts are wellfounded, there has been insufficient responsible debate in public of the great issues raised by our actions in Southeast Asia.

The second assumption is that since a thorough airing of these issues by competent students is a condition for an enlightened public opinion on them, in a liberal democracy such as ours in which governmental policies require the assent of its citizens, students who possess knowledge pertinent to those issues have a special duty to discuss them openly and critically.

#### Aim is stated

In short, the primary aim of this meeting—an aim that surely merits the strong endorsement of all who are committed to the ideals of liberal democracy—is to contribute to the public enlightenment through responsible discussion of a serious problem confronting all of us.

It is possible that a precedent is being set for the development in the academic community of a generally recognized but vigorous and informed opposition to those entrusted with political power, in the best sense of opposition in the great traditions of political democracy.

Let me explain the format of the discussion this afternoon. There are two principal speakers: Dr. George M. Kahin, professor of political science, Cornell University, and Dr. Robert Scalapino, professor of political science, University of California at Berkeley.

Dr. Scalapino has graciously agreed at the last minute to replace the speech that Mr. Bundy had promised to give.

Associated with each of the principal speakers, there's a supporting panel. Because of the lateness of the word received from the White House about the unavailability of Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kahin's supporting panel consists of four members, while Mr. Scalapino's only three, since he was originally one of that group.

Dr. Kahin is associated with Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science and modern history at the University of Chicago; Dr. Mary Wright, professor of history, Yale University; Dr. Stanley Millet, professor of history and political science in Brarcliffe College; Dr. William A. Williams, professor of history, University of Wisconsin.

With Dr. Scalapino is associated a group consisting of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor of government, Columbia University; Dr. Wesley Fishel, professor of political science, Michigan State University, and Dr. Michael Lindsey, professor of government, American University.

The principal speakers will have a half-hour each to present their views; and then share an additional 5 to 10 minutes to discuss what has been said by them. This exchange will be followed by comments or questions from the panelist, each with 6 minutes at his or her disposal, and beginning with Dr. Morgenthau in an order alternating between the supporting groups.

Three minutes will be available to the principal speakers to respond to questions put to them by panelists; or if the speaker prefers to delegate the response, to some member of his supporting panel.

The final portion of these proceedings, which we hope will begin not later than 4:30, because of commitments to various broadcasting systems, will be a general discussion of issues in which principal speakers and panelists will participate.

The meeting will conclude with summations by Drs. Kahin and Scalapino.

The first principal speaker this afternoon is Dr. Kahin.

#### GRAVE ERRORS IN POLICY FOUND

Mr. KAHIN. Mr. Nagel, ladies and gentlemen, I am indeed very sorry to learn that Mr. Bundy finds it impossible to be with us this afternoon. I see no reason therefore for altering in any significant way the remarks I'd planned to make. I will perhaps have a few additional things to say in closing concerning his absence.

Since the end of the last war, American officials have made such grave errors in policy toward southeast Asia that we have every right to be skeptical about their ability to respond intelligently to the present situation in Vietnam. Their most consistent failure has been an inability both to appreciate the importance of Asian nationalism and to work with rather than against this powerful force. This is a major reason why Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia have become so distrustful of the United States, and why they have either broken or come close to breaking their relations with us.

Moreover the obsession of American policy makers with what they still see as monolithic communism has blinded them to the fact that communism in Asia has adapted itself to nationalism. And they have confused the broad but nationally differentiated force and potential of communism with the threat of specifically Chinese power.

Despite the immense information gathering facilities of the Government, serious policy mistakes have been made because decisions have been taken on the basis of inappropriate criteria, wrong analyses and a disregard for the relevant facts. At the same time essential information has been withheld from the American public and crucial policy decisions concerning southeast Asia have been made before the public has even been aware that a problem exists. And once taken, these decisions have set in motion events which severely circumscribed any moderating influence which an informed public opinion might bring to bear.

Moreover in recent months the tendency has increased to dismiss even thoughtful criticism of Government policy as irresponsible meddling.

#### Illusory hope seen

In Vietnam, American policy has been wrong from the outset. In the decade following World War II, because of our illusory hope that we could induce France to become the keystone in an American-designed European military organization, we temporized with our commitment to national self-determination and hacked France in her efforts to reestablish control over Vietnam.

By supporting her attempt to establish a Vietnamese regime which lacked nationalist support, we helped insure that Vietnamese patriots would have no real alternative but to rally to the banner of Ho Chi Minh. France's humiliating defeat at Dienbienphu in 1954 was a military defeat but it was made inevitable by the political failure that preceded it.

Then came the Geneva Agreements clearly specifying that Vietnam was one country. They stipulated that the 17th parallel was a temporary demarcation line, not in any way to be interpreted—and here I'm using the text of the agreement—not in any way to be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.

The United States in its own unilateral declaration at Geneva spoke only of one Vietnam, not of a South, and not of a North, and with respect to the conference's provision for national elections, the United States also stated—again in its own unilateral declaration—that it would continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations.

Nevertheless the United States soon thereafter set out to build up a separate state in the South. And again we made the mistake of thinking we could establish a viable government on an inadequate nationalist base. The United States supported Ngo Dinh Diem giving him, as you know, massive amounts of—economic initially and later—military assistance.

But American aid was no substitute for nationalist support, something Diem's regime never really acquired, despite what our officials told Congress and the American people.

Diem himself had said in 1953—repeatedly, I might add—that Ho Chi Minh—and I'm quoting him—"gained in popularity as a leader of the resistance, not as a Communist," and that the vast majority of his followers were nationalist and in no way pro-Communist.

What the United States failed to recognize was that in these conditions Ho Chi Minh, who for at least 9 years had been the acknowledged head of the Vietnamese nationalist movement, could not be replaced as the leader of the Vietnamese people by a man supported from the outside, a man little known and who had spent the critical years—nearly all of them—of the independence struggle abroad.

America's failure, of course, to build up an effective government under Diem is now well known, but this was not immediately apparent, for after Geneva his regime enjoyed several years of grace during which Ho Chi Minh's followers left it pretty much alone.

Essentially this was due to the fact that the Geneva agreements had promised nationwide elections for 1956 and it was primarily because of this provision and because the agreements also stipulated that France would be responsible for carrying out the accords—carrying out the accords south of the 17th parallel—and that France would remain there until the elections were held—primarily because of those reasons that the Vietminh withdrew its armies from the south and for a considerable period suspended revolutionary activity there.

But with American encouragement Diem refused to permit the elections in 1956 and France washed her hands of the responsibilities which she had assumed at Geneva.

#### *Reneging is charged*

Regardless of what sophistry has been employed to demonstrate otherwise, by encouraging Diem to defy this central provision of the Geneva agreements, the United States reneged on the position it had taken there in its own unilateral declaration.

Civil war in Vietnam became inevitable, for when a military struggle for power ends on the agreed condition that the competition will be transferred to the political level, can the side which violates the agreed conditions legitimately expect that the military struggle will not be resumed?

Despite the initial period of insulation from Vietminh militancy and despite unstinted American economic and political backing, Diem failed to develop a real base of popular support. Programs urged by the United States for social and economic reform, and for winning the allegiance of the non-Vietnamese hill-dwelling people, were never effectively carried out.

The Saigon regime remained all too isolated from the Vietnamese peasantry. As a result, it was unable to compete with the Vietcong guerrillas when, from 1958 on, these

guerrillas adopted increasingly militant policies.

And in the 19 months since the assassination of Diem, the situation has continued to deteriorate and the shifting combinations of army officers and bureaucrats controlling the Government have remained just as isolated from the villagers of Vietnam.

Faced with this decline in political cohesion, and the evident inability of the South Vietnamese military to stave off the Vietcong, the present administration has enlarged the war in Vietnam by bombing the north and increasing American military activity in the south.

#### *Power called the reply*

It has endeavored to compensate for the continuing erosion of Saigon's political and military base by introducing more American troops, more American air power.

It has justified this in terms of our pledge to support Vietnam, a commitment which, as you know, the administration regards as a test case.

And here I think it might be appropriate to recall the caveat of Secretary Acheson in 1950 when he stated that America could not by itself create politically stable states in Asia.

#### *KENNEDY REMARK OF 1963 QUOTED*

President Kennedy also recognized these limitations when, in September of 1963, he said of the South Vietnamese, "In the final analysis it's their war—they're the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, give them equipment. We can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it."

In the context of these cautions, does an unconditional American military pledge to a weak and factious regime which lacks popular backing—does that make common sense? Is our pledge of support completely unqualified? Does it not demand a minimum degree of performance and cooperation from Saigon—political as well as military? Is our pledge automatically to any military or civilian group which happens to control Saigon? What happens if our current policy of brinkmanship induces Hanoi to send its 300,000-man army into South Vietnam?

Because this it may very well do if the damage inflicted by the United States becomes so great that the North has little to lose by undertaking a retaliatory attack and little to save through compromise and negotiation.

The well-known military analyst, Hanson Baldwin, has estimated that to cope effectively with such a force the United States might have to use as many as a million men.

The United States, of course, does not have these forces immediately available and even to send in a small proportion would use up our entire strategic reserve.

This same trend toward a rapprochement with Russia started by President Eisenhower, continued by President Kennedy, that trend has already been seriously affected by our policy in Vietnam and it will be further undermined if we continue on our present course.

Among Communist Parties throughout Asia as well as among the nonaligned states generally, China's scornful derision of Russia's policy of peaceful coexistence has been gaining ever-wider approval.

The possibility of cooperation between the United States and Russia to contain China's power—China's power and influence in southeast Asia—is becoming evermore remote. Our major aim in Asia is to contain China and thus to provide the opportunity for the states of south and southeast Asia to develop free from Peiping's dominating influence.

And it is this consideration which should govern American policy toward Vietnam.

No matter how much military power we pour into Vietnam, the present American policy of trying to sustain a separate state in the south may very well fail because the local political factors necessary to insure success are simply not there.

If we are going to salvage anything in Vietnam, we will achieve more through a cease-fire and a negotiated political settlement than through the futile infusion of more and more American military power.

The United States must recognize that the historic Vietnam fear of—fear of and antagonism toward—China continues—continues despite the common adherence to Communist ideology. And inasmuch as the character of Vietnamese communism is inseparable from Vietnamese nationalism, Vietnamese power will not necessarily be exerted in concert with Chinese power.

#### *DEFINING INTEREST*

This is likely to depend upon whether such actions conform with Vietnamese national interest as the Vietnamese people define that interest.

Those who still are impressed by the simplistic domino theory must realize that non-Communist governments of southeast Asia will not automatically collapse if the Communists should come to control all of Vietnam. So long as southeast Asian governments are in harmony with their nation's nationalism, so long as they are wise enough to meet the most pressing economic and social demands of their people, they are not likely to succumb to communism.

Nationalism and the demand for social and economic progress are the dominant forces in southeast Asia today. If we can work with these forces, if we can work with them we will make a major contribution to maintaining the territorial integrity of the states of southeast Asia and provide them with a better opportunity to develop along non-Communist lines.

The first step in that direction must be to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam.

What has our position been thus far? I think you know it well. The administration tells us that it is prepared to negotiate unconditionally but in effect on condition that the Vietcong cease all operations immediately and on condition that the state of South Vietnam—and this is the most important condition, I would say—on condition that the state of South Vietnam continue its separate existence in permanent violation of the Geneva agreements.

Furthermore, we have made clear that the Vietcong and its political arm, the National Liberation Front, cannot be party to such negotiations. Not only is that one more condition, but it flies squarely in the face of reality—political reality.

It is, I think, widely acknowledged that at least half of the South is today under the control of the Vietcong. It is not utopian to assume that Hanoi is in a position to insist upon the Vietcong's yielding up the position it has won there?

In 1954, the Vietminh could induce its numerous supporters in the South to accept Vietnam's partition and to abandon their gains south of the 17th parallel, because partition was regarded as a temporary measure to last only until elections.

But we cannot assume that once again the insurgents in the South will give up what they have won through long and difficult campaigns.

Over the last 5 years, the doctrine of uncompromising struggle and a real expectation of victory had been assiduously nurtured among the Vietcong. While there is undoubtedly a considerable congruence of interest between Hanoi and the Vietcong, under these circumstances we cannot assume that Hanoi can abruptly call off the southerners' resistance.

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And whatever influence Hanoi can exert over the Vietcong, we cannot expect it to exert this so long as we continue bombing the north.

The morale of the North Vietnamese is, of course, no more likely to be broken by bombs than was that of the British or the Russians in the last war. Indeed their will is likely to be stiffened. President Johnson said after our Embassy in Saigon had been bombed that outrages like this will only reinforce the determination of the American people and Government. What is true for Americans is true for the Vietnamese.

Halting our bombardment of the north would be our first genuine indication of an interest in negotiations. Our quite cavalier dismissal of the United Nations Secretary General's efforts hardly constituted a serious American interest in negotiations. I submit that we should give him an unequivocal mandate to pursue negotiations and that we should make clear that we want not just discussions but serious negotiations.

*Support of others urged*

And I would suggest that concurrently we should give much more encouragement than we have to those nonaligned Asian and African states which wish to help promote a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

And finally, for those many American who still regard full public discussion of vitally important national issues as essential to our brand of democracy, there is a particularly disquieting domestic aspect of this situation:

Realizing as they do that an informed public discussion requires access to the relevant facts, these Americans can only be deeply disturbed when a spokesman for the newspaper editors of this country feels compelled to state as he did last month that the American press in Vietnam faces stronger restrictions than it ever has in wartime and that we are getting contradictions, doublets and half-truths from the Government concerning the situation in Vietnam.

And surely Americans have grounds for concern when the New York Times can editorialize, as it did shortly after this, less than 3 weeks ago, that high-ranking representatives of government in Washington and in Saigon have so obscured, confused, or distorted news from Vietnam or have made such fatuously erroneous valuations about the course of the war that the credibility of the U.S. Government has been sacrificed.

When the American public faces the prospect of war it has the right to full and honest answers.

I had indeed hoped that Mr. Bundy's appearance would be an indication of a change in the administration's attitude as to the value of informed public discussion. I can only hope that his indispensability in meeting some major crisis of policymaking is really of greater importance than the contribution he might have made this afternoon toward our better understanding of the administration's aims and to that kind of enlightened public discussion which is so essential to the wisest conduct of foreign policy.

*IS VIETCONG AN INGENIOUS FORCE?*

Mr. NACEL. The second principal speaker is Professor Scalapino.

Professor SCALAPINO. Mr. Moderator, ladies and gentlemen of the panel, ladies and gentlemen of the audience, both here and unseen:

First, it should be perfectly clear that I am not here as a spokesman for the Government. I did not know—I do not know—what Mr. Bundy would have said. As the moderator has made clear, we knew about this on both sides of this panel only about 12:30 and consequently my remarks will be strictly those of myself as prepared rather hastily after that time.

Now it seems to me that in beginning I would not start my remarks with an his-

torical background as did Professor Kahin. I would rather prefer to work those into some of the critical questions to which I would like to address myself.

The first of these questions, which is, I think, critical, is as follows:

Is the Vietcong a truly indigenous force in South Vietnam and has it achieved its strength for its support such as it is through promoting socioeconomic reform?

To me, the answer to this question, while complicated, is, on balance, no.

Let me site, to begin, an editorial from the Peiping Daily Worker of April 15 of this year and reproduced in the Peiping Review on April 23. Said Peiping: The Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation is a just revolutionary struggle against aggression. It is certain to win, because there is the wise leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Workers Party of Vietnam, because there is the unity of the 30 million Vietnamese people, and because there is sympathy and support from people the world over."

I call to your attention the first phrase in that statement: "Because there is the wise leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Workers Party of Vietnam." I think that there is little question that the Vietcong is a carbon copy of the Vietminh which preceded it. This is certainly not to say that it does not have indigenous support and leadership in nominal terms at least. Clearly most of the leaders of the National Liberation Front originated from the south as that front is now structured. And whatever the bewildering differences in figures, I am prepared to say that a significant segment of the National Liberation Front is still southern in origin.

*CRITICAL FACTORS*

But what are the truly critical factors? These factors, it seems to me, are as follows:

First, who does know the leadership of the National Liberation Front? Individuals like Nguyen Wuc Ngo. How many either in or out of Vietnam really subscribe to their leadership? The real leaders of the Vietcong are, and have always been, those in small hard-core elements that are also members of the Communist Party—and that party has Hanoi as its headquarters now as in the past.

The South Vietnamese Revolutionary Party numbers no more than 500 or so. It could not possibly be expected to dominate the 500,000-man party of the north. Not only is the leadership of this movement shadowy indeed, but take a look at its basic principles. I urge you to read them carefully, because I suggest that though there may have been differences in tactics between the South National Liberation Front and the North Workers Party, or Laodong group, there have been no differences up to date on the question of basic policies or of fundamental programs.

This is not an unusual movement. The Vietminh also had innumerable non-Communist elements. The Vietminh also until it came to power claimed to be a multiclass, multifront organization dedicated to national liberation of Vietnam. But it ended up as you well know under the domination of the Communist Party and opponents were either liquidated, silenced, or reformed.

Thus it seems to me what is critical here is that we do indeed face a complicated situation in which borrowing heavily from Chinese revolutionary tactics of the past a five-stage development toward revolution is involved.

The first stage is always to build a tightly disciplined, carefully controlled Communist Party that is not susceptible to penetration from the outside.

The second stage is to develop a united-front movement, and in this stage of course one solicits the support if one can obtain it of the peasantry, of the intelligentsia, of the petit bourgeois, using such socioeco-

nomic issues and nationalist issues as can be used.

The third stage is that when this united front is built one moves into guerrilla warfare.

The fourth stage that if guerrilla warfare is basically successful and the cities can be surrounded one moves into positional warfare.

And thence to victory, and the establishment of a people's democracy in which the real opponents of the regime are at that point out.

For I know of no significant opposition in North Vietnam today that survived this five-stage development and could remain in true opposition to the leaders of the Laodong party.

I think it is important to understand this development, because it is neither unique to Vietnam, nor for that matter of fact, to China, whence it came earlier; nor, in certain respects, to North Korea.

It is a phenomenon that involves a combination of civil war and international aid and assistance. And unless both ingredients are given their approximate weight and role, I think one misunderstands the complexity of the problem, and the difficulty of the solution.

Let me raise another question: Does the Vietcong really command the support and allegiance of the people of South Vietnam?

*Answer must be "No"*

I think again, though the answer is complicated, the answer on balance must be no.

What is a true phenomenon is that though the Diem Government made many mistakes, and I am not here in any sense to defend it, although the Diem Government made many mistakes, one of the interesting things is that very few, if any, significant anti-Diem leaders in the South joined the Vietcong. One of the significant things is that today still, the great popular elements of South Vietnam are not a part of the Vietcong, nor have they ever been.

I refer to the Buddhists. And the Buddhist solution for this problem, neutralist as it is, does not involve the movement of the Vietcong into power. The latest Buddhist proposal that I've seen urges that all Vietcong elements go North, Americans go out, and some kind of international force come in.

Now, second: What about the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.

There are groups that command in some degree the allegiance of millions of Vietnamese. The Cao Dai alone has some 2 million in its reported membership. Have these leaders joined the Vietcong? Have they supported this so-called national liberation movement?

There have been some exceptions. One is always able to pick up in united-front activities 5 Catholics, 3 Hoa Hao, 10 Buddhists. But en masse, the leadership that represents the central strength of the really important functional elements of South Vietnam are not, and have never been, a part of this Communist-dominated National Liberation Front.

It is not to say that they support the present Government necessarily.

But what I think is more important is to say that through the stresses, the travails, the uncertainties of months and years of civil war, they did not join the Communist movement.

And I think it is also significant, quite frankly, to point out that the successes of the Vietcong are neither attributable alone to the appeals which they have been able to make on social, economic or nationalist grounds.

I would not depreciate those appeals, or their success in some quarters. But what I would emphasize and reemphasize is the fact that Communist strength in South Vietnam, as in many other areas, is also heavily attributable to organizational skill.

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*"A powerful weapon"*

If one takes hold of a movement politically and can organize it, mobilize it, and utilize all of the organizational technique, then one has, indeed, a powerful weapon—particularly when one works in a truly diverse, heterogeneous, nonorganized society.

## THREE BROAD ALTERNATIVES SEEN

It does not necessarily mean, however, that because one has organizational control, one has public support. I think anyone familiar with American big-city politics must know that.

The fact is that organization is critical to Communist success in Asia and elsewhere and very frequently coercion as much as persuasion is involved. How many village officials, good, bad and indifferent, have been killed by the Vietcong in recent years?

Some estimates are 6,000. I have no doubt that some of them were bad, many of them indifferent, some of them good, but the only question that was really asked was, do they support the Government or don't they?

And if they do, then they're finished. For to root out the willful bases of power that critical in the development of a moment like this, and it has little to do quite frankly with the appeal of issues, socioeconomic or others.

Now I make these points because I think that if the true allegiance of the people of South Vietnam could really be tested, it is very doubtful that they would vote for the Vietcong. And this question of elections, in Geneva or after the Geneva agreements, or elsewhere, troubles me greatly.

For I do not know, frankly, of any state that has been controlled by the Communists which could afford to allow free elections. And quite frankly in recent announcements coming out of Hanoi, I have seen nothing to indicate that Hanoi is interested in elections in the north.

*Mass media system*

I have seen nothing to indicate that they would really relinquish the mass media communications system for purposes of a true dialog, that they would allow the establishment of class enemy parties.

I have seen nothing to indicate that the formula of free elections which is meaningful in the democratic context can be meaningful in a Communist context. And if that is true, then was the Geneva agreement always a fraudulent one? Then was it clearly fraudulent from the beginning to assume that you could have free elections in a society dominated by men who regard class enemies as susceptible to control through whatever means possible?

Now, I think that when it comes to the basic issues that confront us today, they were outlined in broad terms very well this morning by Professor Schlesinger. We are confronted, at least theoretically, with three broad alternatives: Withdrawal, Negotiations, Or escalation.

It seems to me clear that the arguments against withdrawal are so powerful and so strong that at least as yet they have not been answered.

It is not merely that withdrawal would reduce American credibility with her allies and neutrals round the world, but it is also that it would a "green light" to the new national liberation movements which are even now getting underway. I do not need to remind you that Peiping has broadcast repeatedly its intent to support the Thai national liberation movement and has already launched the first propaganda with this matter in hand.

If socioeconomic interests are the critical question, we would have some curious new kinds of analyses to make. We cannot ignore the ingredient of power. And central to this, it seems to me, is the fact that for

more than 5 years, Peiping and Moscow have been arguing vigorously about the way in which to handle American imperialism. That argument, which has gone down to this present month, is roughly speaking as follows, and I think you know it well:

American imperialism, argues Peiping, is a "paper tiger." Push and attack—it will retreat. It is not to be taken as a nuclear blackmail threat. The problem with the Russians, argues Peiping, is that they have been too sensitive to American power, too willing to compromise, too unwilling to push the revolutionary movement forward.

It seems to me that, above all, withdrawal—with withdrawal would prove that Peiping was right and make it virtually impossible for moderation to prevail inside the world Communist movement. For if the strategy of pushing American power and forcing it into a unilateral retreat works—if it works in Vietnam, it will work elsewhere and be tried everywhere.

*Domino view altered*

I do not subscribe to the domino theory precisely. I think it should be more applicable to checkers theory. For, Peiping will jump over—not only states which she can neutralize, but perhaps even continents. She will jump to those areas where she can build the ingredients for this kind of formula. And, indeed, as long as she has the combination of privileged sanctuaries within her own territory and that of her allies; as long as she had the ingredients, her mobilizing manpower and equipment for their support and training, as long as she had these ingredients, then, I think, she had a strategy that was well-nigh foolproof.

Let me then move to this question of negotiation: I suspect the overwhelming majority of people in this room, and listening to us, favor negotiation. And I suspect that the critical issues, therefore, to come is: Who is willing to negotiate and on what terms.

Up to date—and we can certainly hope that this will change—the Chinese have indicated very little willingness to negotiate. They have refused U Thant's proposed visit to Peiping, a visit which, incidentally, had our support. They have also declined to accept the overtures of the English and the French either privately or publicly, to move toward any kind of negotiation.

Their comments upon the recent proposal of the Indians can be summed up in one word: "Ridiculous," they said concerning an Afro-Asian international force.

Their sabotage, or attempted sabotage, of the Cambodian conference is well known to everyone. In short, it seems to me that on the record whatever they have been, the quaims of the United States toward coming to the conference table, we have explored and we have allowed our allies to explore every combination of public and private opportunity that seemed promising.

And we are still hoping that at least Hanoi will come forward and break its tie, now more than 2 years old, with Peiping and move into a new orbit of independence.

The whole history of Vietnam indicates that while there has always been a stout resistance to China on the one hand there has always been a strong element willing to cooperate and collaborate with China on the other. And this brings to me—I think—the focus of this problem; namely, the question of the containment of China.

May I say that I agree very much with Professor KAHIN when he talks about the importance of aligning ourselves openly with Asian nationalists. I think this is critical.

May I suggest also that I think that there may be some slight discrepancy in his thesis that on the one hand the nationalist movement and the Communist movement are antithetical, which I think he suggested at

one point, and on the other that they can be united.

In my opinion both are possible. They can be united sometimes, for purposes that are perhaps limited in time and space, but can also be antithetical.

But what I would urge you to look at here is to see how clearly was communism in Asia truly the product of nationalism and the nationalist capture.

In part it was, but only in part. North Korean communism was implanted as a result of Soviet power. And I suggest that the pressures which Communist China is putting upon the small neutralist countries today—unless they are counteracted by some balance of power in this region—will be antinationalist and increasingly satellite in character.

These are small states, the survival of which depends upon some balance of power—a balance of power, I say, that must be a combination of both Western and Asian power, that must represent a fusion, for today it is critical that we come into line with such major societies in Asia as Japan and India, and I would hope some day, Indonesia. For these are societies with whom we can work in forwarding the social, economic, and nationalist revolutions that the last 2 or 3 years are indications that Communist power unchecked will ultimately impose its own version of socioeconomic revolution and will ultimately impose its own sense of national interest.

I say that this policy, in conclusion, can run along these lines:

First, our broad objective should be a neutral, nonaligned Asia that is truly neutral and nonaligned, not the Communist version of the Vietcong.

Secondly we should, of course, negotiate. But we should make it clear that we are not negotiating just with labels, that we are negotiating with men representing forces. We should negotiate with the Communists in South Vietnam as Communists, and we should negotiate with the other elements in terms of whatever representation they truly represent. It must be remembered that the Buddhists are the largest functional group in South Vietnam and they certainly dwarf the Vietcong in numbers and supporters.

And lastly, I would say this, that I think that as long as we maintain two open channels not only for the neutrals but for the Communists, one in which we urge social, economic, cultural exchange, one in which we urge peace coexistence, one in which we desire the exchange of scholars, journalists, and economic development—yes, with China, as with others. And the other channel in which we say we will not surrender unconditionally, we will not be driven out by a philosophy that regards compromise as evil as long as it takes that stand, as long as we keep these channels open and operative in an imaginative sense, I do not see how we can fail in the long run to reach a solution to our problems.

## STUDY OF HANOI ELECTION RECORD

Professor KAHIN. With regard to the attitude of Hanoi government to elections, if you—I'm sure you have studied the election records there—but for years after Geneva that government did remind the South of its desire for elections, it did remind the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference for several years repeatedly thereafter even after the date of 1956 had gone by that it still wanted the elections, and if Hanoi says today it wants to go back to the Geneva agreements in their entirety, I submit that it wants to go back to elections conducted under international auspices as well.

I've been looking at the record, as I suppose you have, of Hanoi broadcasts during the last month and I haven't seen any indication to suggest that it does not want elections. I would ask Professor Scalapino why

it is, because I think that this is germane, that the United States continues to press for elections uniting Germany and Korea that has in no case I know of in recent years indicated any willingness to do so in Vietnam and where it did before attach conditions.

I hope you won't mind my saying, Bob, but your analysis of the internal political balance in Hanoi was given with more self-assurance than I've ever heard anyone give before, and I think that insofar that one can scrutinize this, he is impressed with consistent zigs and zags of policy as between Russia and Communist China.

*Statement at seminar*

With regard to the matter of nationalism, may I go back to 1953 when I quoted Diem before he was at a seminar we had at Cornell and he made these same statements afterward. His most poignant concern at that time was that the vast majority of real nationalists as he put it had either made their political usefulness much the less by having been attentive—in other words opportunistic politically as he saw it during the previous years—or had in fact already gone over to the Vietminh. A major proportion of them, as he said at that time, had gone over to the Vietminh and he added the words the most courageous of them.

I'd also suggest that when a nationalist movement is frustrated in its efforts to win independence that it can very easily spill over into Communist-controlled channels, particularly in a country like Vietnam, where there was a very particular history.

The French were very hard on nationalists and well before the war the Vietnamese Communist Party had gone underground and had developed a capacity to operate effectively underground that no other nationalist party had.

And during the Japanese occupation, as you recall, there was an arrangement between the Japanese and the Vichy French—the Vichy French worked with the Japanese—and both of them made it very difficult for the Communists to operate anywhere else except underground and this was true for nationalists in general.

Nationalists elsewhere in southeast Asia were often given some opportunity to organize and develop by the Japanese occupation authorities. Not so in Indochina. They had to work. Non-Communist nationalists had to work underground and in working underground they naturally gravitated toward the only well-organized underground that was in existence.

Professor SCALAPINO. First, let me talk to the question of Hanoi's allegiances. I want to admit that this is a very complicated matter and one still, I think, in very great dispute within the Laodong Party of North Vietnam. However, having followed rather closely both Hoktob and Nandan for the last 3 years in translation, I have come to the conclusion, and I think most other scholars on North Vietnam have come to the conclusion, that there is a very obvious, and decided, and total swing in that period.

Now it may, as I say, be swinging back, because I think that our bombing in the North had a political impact upon that party, and a very decisive one. But let me quote you, just so that I won't be saying something that you have to take on my faith, let me quote you two items, the first one from September 25, 1963, "Peace or Violence," the name of the article, September, 1963, Hoktob, which talks about the modern revisionists and rightists; "Opportunists are doing their utmost to peddle pacifism and misrepresent the Marxist-Leninist theory on the role of violence in history."

Let me quote you an article from one of the leading North Vietnamese generals, Pham No Mal, which appeared in the March 11 People's Army newspaper in Hanoi of this

year: "All over the world the struggle movement for peace, independence, democracy and socialism is developing and is winning real victories. The flag of Marxism-Leninism is being waved more and more in all the five continents. Modern revisionism is being defeated, but it has not yet been completely eliminated, and the struggle between the two paths is continuing."

*question of nationalism*

Now with respect to this question of nationalism, let me reiterate, and this is all I can do, George, one of the point that I tried to make in my unprepared remarks, namely, that it seems to me that the issue of how communism treats nationalism both in ideological terms and in policy terms is entirely derivative from certain other considerations, that is, I have the strongest feeling that most of the leaders of the Vietcong in the South are—owe their primary allegiance to Hanoi and its policy formation, and that how the Hanoi party goes will determine the future of the South and that, in turn, the general situation in Asia will determine whether Asian nationalism for small states is viable. But it seems to me we have seen increasingly that unless we can establish some balance of power in Asia, nationalism is going to go under in societies like Cambodia, it's going to go under in societies like Burma.

The inexorable pressure of the big states that are just emerging now, of which China is one but not the only one, is going to submerge indigenous Asian nationalism in its own concept of its own ideological interest and its own self-interest from a national standpoint. And I think the evidence is already piling up on this score. If a Prince Sihanouk has to call off the Cambodian Conference, if the Burmese have to worry about whether the Communists are going to come into their Government or not because of pressures, if on all sides one has to ask, "What does Peiping think and say?"; then it seems to me nationalism is under assault.

And it is up to us, and I think we are the largest power in the world that truly does not have serious economic and political interests that lie in this form of neocolonialism in Asia. I think we are the power that can align ourselves with the true nationalist movements of this area and, I repeat, that it seems to me that the evidence thus far shows that most of the true South Vietnamese anti-Communist or non-Communist leaders do not regard the Vietcong as a nationalist movement.

The main—the key Buddhists have not joined it; the key Catholics have not joined it; the key Hoa Hoa and Cao Dai groups have not joined it. There are some exceptions. But by and large, that's a shadowy movement without the kind of leadership that really speaks to the issue of nationalism.

And in closing, I would like to have Professor Kahin speak to really two themes. I would like to have him discuss whether or not he believes that the Vietcong is similar or identical to the Cietminh and that, in all probability, it is or is not Communist controlled—what are its other components.

I would like to have him pursue this, then, by suggesting what he thinks would happen if we withdrew from South Vietnam unilaterally.

Second, I would like to ask him what he proposes to do if the Chinese and through them, other elements of the Communist movement, continue to remain adamant on the question of negotiations—something that we hope, very much, will not happen.

But suppose they continue to denounce the 17-nation approach, the Indian approach, all other approaches to negotiations as ridiculous, a plot to show China up. Then what is our next move?

*SOME OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS*

Mr. NAGEL. I regret I cannot give Mr. Kahin the opportunity to reply at this point.

But there will be, hopefully, the chance to do so in the final part of the proceedings.

We now come to observations and questions by the various commentators. I would like to remind both them and you that each will have not more than 6 minutes, to be followed by any response that the principal speaker may wish to make.

I will—because of the distribution of mikes, I think it'll be best if each of the commentators remains and talks into the mike in front of him. And since not everybody is visible from every fixed point, I think, perhaps, the best way of telling you when your time is nearly up if I rise 1 minute before and so indicate.

The first commentator is Prof. Hans Morgenthau.

Professor MORGENTHAU. Let me suppose that Professor Scalapino's analysis of the facts in southeast Asia is correct in every particular—a mere hypothetical assumption on my part.

What would the consequences for American policy be?

Professor Scalapino speaks very softly about the establishment of a balance of power. I speak very crudely about war against China.

For I see here one of the basic inner contradictions of our official policy which makes, as speakers have reminded us this morning and this afternoon, those problems so terribly complicated.

It is because we set ourselves goals in Asia and we have done so, I should say in parting, for half a century, which cannot be achieved with the means we are willing to employ.

And as it is in philosophy and in pure logic, if you pose a wrong question you find it extremely complex to give a simple and correct answer.

*Something basically wrong*

And the uneasiness in the country of which this assembly is an impressive manifestation, I think stems from this instinctive recognition that there's something basically wrong in the modes of thought and action of our Government, that there is an essential contradiction or a number of contradictions between what we profess to want and the policies we want to employ and the risks which we want to take.

And I submit again, as I have done this morning, and have done before in lectures many times, that if you really want to achieve in Asia what the spokesman for our Government say they want to achieve, you must be ready to go to war with China, with all that that implies.

I would also say a word—I'm getting nervous—about negotiations. Much has been made of our willingness to negotiate. There is, of course, no doubt, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy didn't need to emphasize it, that our Government wants a peaceful solution. No decent government which isn't out of its mind would want anything else.

But this is not the point. The point is not what you intend, but the point is what you do regardless of your intentions. The history of the world is full of instances where well-meaning, high-principled people have brought unspeakable misery upon their own nation in spite of their good intentions, because it used the wrong policies.

Let me turn to the problem of negotiations. Of course we want a negotiated settlement, and I'm sure there are people in our Government who pray for a negotiated settlement, if only the other side would make a move.

But those people cannot see that the implicit conditions which we have made—the unspoken conditions—make a negotiated settlement at the moment impossible.

For, first of all, we refuse to negotiate with the Vietcong.

Second, we make it an implicit condition that we remain—at least for the time being—in South Vietnam—that is to say,

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as long as no stable government is established there, which will take a very long time.

Now the other side is fully aware of the blind alley in which we find ourselves in South Vietnam. We don't have the courage to retreat and we don't dare to advance too far.

And so obviously from the point of view of Peiping, which hasn't lost a single man in that conflict and has only lost, as far as we can tell, one gun, which Mr. McNamara showed the other day in a press conference.

Of course from the point of view of Peiping, nothing better could happen than the United States waging a war in Vietnam which it is not able to win and which it cannot afford to lose.

Why should Peiping under such circumstances recommend negotiations?

Negotiations are possible only under the conditions such as when one recognizes the inevitable facts of life in Asia which, as I have said before, can only be changed by war.

Mr. BREZINSKI. Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen. It seems to me that the basic issue that we are facing here today involves the fact that we're living in an age of very rapid change with many countries and several continents undergoing many revolutions rolled into one. Out of that condition arises two basic questions: What will be the nature of the change which these societies are going to experience and are experiencing, and what role can the United States play in these changes?

It seems to me that in Asia we have demonstrated not perfection but a positive commitment to social change—in Japan, where we have helped the reconstruction of a country ravaged by war and social reform. We are doing the same in India, in Pakistan, in Thailand, in Taiwan. We have maintained our economic presence and assistance because we have been able to maintain our political presence.

And our political presence will be denied if the United States and those associated with it permit themselves to be expelled militarily. And yet that in many respects is the issue today in southeast Asia: The nature of change, of social reform, whether it will be by evolution or by more rapid, coercive, indeed violent means, and whether the United States will be associated with it.

*International politics*

There are those who argue the revolution in South Vietnam is purely indigenous and nationalistic. Now I'm not an expert on southeast Asia, I'm interested in international politics. I can only judge on the basis of what I read. And I'd like to read to you two passages written by men who are not known as apologists for the administration and both associated with a newspaper which has been highly critical of the administration, particularly editorially.

The first comment is by Robert Kleiman in the New York Times, an editorial writer. He states that after years—5 years—the so-called war of national liberation in South Vietnam still retains its original characteristics as an armed conspiracy. The Vietcong has scored military successes and entrenched itself politically in many rural areas. But there has never been any sign of a mass uprising. And then he goes on to discuss the relative absence of popular support for the Vietcong.

Peter Grose, writing in the Times Magazine, states clearly and explicitly that the South Vietnamese Vietcong operation is controlled from the north, directed from the north, supported from the north, and, indeed, even cites North Vietnamese admission to that effect.

*HOPE FOR EVOLUTION TO EFFECT CHANGE*

Now I cite that because the basic issue here seems to me to lie in the fact that we are not

trying to overthrow the North Vietnamese Government. We are not trying to change an existing political situation. And, as in Europe, we hope to rely on the passage of time and evolution to effect change, a condition which I hasten to add the Soviet leadership accepted after Cuba when it desisted from the use of force to change the situation in Europe and itself is banking on evolutionary change, on the peaceful transition to socialism to attain its objectives. Now that condition is yet to be attained in Asia.

There are those who say that it can never be, for China is the predominant power in the region. Let us assume for a second that it is. So was Japan in 1940. Does that mean we should not have taken the course we did? So was Germany in Europe in 1940. So was the Soviet Union in Europe in 1945-46. Yet this did not justify the conclusion that one should therefore disengage and in a self-fulfilling prophecy make right the assertion—make right the assertion that China is the predominant power and prove it by disengaging.

We may or may not have been remiss in the past, but the fact is that in a number of societies we have shown that we can relate ourselves positively to their development. And today we are trying to negotiate over the issue of Vietnam.

We have made a number of proposals. These proposals have been accompanied by proposals from the 17 nations, from India, from U Thant and the United Nations, and none of these proposals have been accepted because at the present time the other side makes a demand which involves a qualitative change in the political status quo. That demand, it seems to me, is ahistorical and dangerous in the nuclear age.

It is imperative that both sides—both sides, all major powers, learn that in the nuclear age the existing political status quo cannot be changed by force. And I repeat—it is not us who are trying to overthrow the North Vietnamese Government. It is the South Vietnamese Government which is being tested from the North.

Professor SCALAPINO. If I may risk a simplification of Professor Morgenthau's thesis: It seems to me that he is coming pretty close to saying that either war or withdrawal from Asia is inevitable for the United States—that we must either get out or we must go to war with China.

I may be misinterpreting him, but that's the way I read his remarks and he'll have a chance to rebut this if I'm wrong.

Now, I would just like to reiterate what's been said by other people here. I don't believe in historical inevitability. But if I did, I would put this in precisely the opposite framework. I would say that withdrawal at this point will mean war. Because I think it will inevitably settle, at least for the time being, the issue of how to meet American imperialism, as the Communists put it.

I think it will inevitably cause the launching not of a thousand ships, but a thousand revolts—not just in Asia, but wherever this movement can get underway. And I think that that means war. Under what conditions, I cannot predict, nor can you.

*The critical issue*

Now it seems to me that that's the critical issue.

We are engaged—we are engaged in the hard, difficult, complex task of trying again to build a containment policy, if you will, but one that is more broadly gaged than the past. And I would simply end my answer to Mr. Morgenthau's comment by suggesting that if you take the last 10 years, I think that the United States, itself a late-developing society in terms of world leadership, has learned a great deal; has moved a great distance.

Ten years ago we were still saying—some of us, not I, but some—that neutralism was

immoral. Today, we are prepared—and I think this is true of both of our major parties—to work with and underwrite, when we can, neutral and nonaligned states.

We have people—and this point ought to be underlined and reemphasized—who are not reactionary; who are not committed to the past, and who have found that between us and the Communists they'd rather take their chances on socioeconomic reform and development with us.

And I maintain that in some of the areas where the American commitment has been heaviest in Asia, the standard of living is going up most rapidly.

This is important, not because I want to whitewash American policy, I think we've made many mistakes in the past, we're still making some—I've been a frequent critic of American policy myself—but I think the time has come, both to face up to alternatives and at the same time to point out again and again that, if we can't do something to preserve a certain openness in these societies, then, it seems to me, the balance of power will be abruptly changed and global war will shortly ensue.

*UNITED STATE SAID TO CREATE SITUATION*

Professor KAHIN. Well, there are just two points that I'd like to make. One, I was pleased at his reliance upon the New York Times. I would hope that his reading is a little wider and that he reads some of the other views in the Times. One healthy thing about the Times is, it seems to me, the variety of viewpoints—and there are others expressed.

The other point that he made that I would like to take issue with is this: that in Vietnam we are not trying to change an existing situation. And I say this is true in a basic sense. And the reason is because the situation that exists is one which we created, beginning in 1956, and which we are simply trying to maintain. No, we're not trying to change it basically. The trouble is it's an artificial situation and it's one that can't be shored up militarily. It lacks basic political ingredients.

MARY WRIGHT. My differences with Professor Scalapino and his analysis of the situation are very deep and very profound and we are talking about a very serious matter here. It's a good deal more serious than I expected it to be when we came into this platform today.

I agree with him, with his very curious and earnest statement, that I, too, will fight for American soil. But when he makes that plea for Asia. We will not be moved out of Asia. We will not give up unilaterally. I am absolutely dumbfounded, because he links it to a policy of getting into alignment with nations like India and Japan.

He surely is as well aware as I am and all of you are of what our policy and the kind of policy he poses, the kind of tensions that this has placed on our sound relation with Japan and India.

We are risking our relations with Japan and India.

It's a very serious thing.

I am in favor of attempting to provide multiple outlets for nationalism for the new nations, but only when we are wanted.

Professor Scalapino would like Asia a certain way. I agree with Professor Morgenthau that to have the Asia that he has outlined is not only impossible within the means which we are willing to use, it is impossible within the means at our command.

Because we sit here with an Asia projected of how we would want it. We are trying to disavow the Communist revolution in China. We pretend it doesn't exist there. We talk against the advice of our best friends of Europe, against our best allies as far as Asia goes. We upset the nonaligned countries. We bring in far more military aid than the opposition is bringing in as far as that goes.

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We've got some lessons of history here to learn and Mr. Brzezinski's parallels are those very dangerous intellectual exercises—faulty parallels—to the position of Hitler's Germany or Imperial Japan. Because this is not the first time that a great power has gone to war to try to save—use military force to try to save Asia from communism.

I find myself in very profound opposition to my friends and colleagues on the panel and on the other side.

It appears to me that the Communist revolution has been won in China; as Mr. Brzezinski says, a great deal has happened in the last 20 years. The one place it's not happened is in Chinese-American relations.

We've either got to accept the fact of the existence of Communist China and agree—and if you ask some Japanese and Indians, who, of course, will tell you at once that Communist China is the preponderant power in Asia—and try to come to deal with it as best we can, extricate ourselves where we are clearly not wanted militarily with what dignity we can muster, not because it's easy for a great power to retreat, but because it's almost the last moment to retreat in Vietnam and salvage something.

Professor SCALABINO: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to respond to that now.

I think it's better for me to respond now than after another speaker. Though I certainly respect the judgment of the Chair on these matters:

Firstly, we do indeed differ, Professor Wright and I, both in interpretation and in fact. Because I regard about 60 percent of what she said as nonfact and it would take me a long time to go over this.

Sometimes, nonfact comes in nonspoken statements, incidentally. For example, the question of our relations with Japan and India and the other non-Communist countries. I do not want for a moment to obscure the fact that there is opposition to our policy in Asia, as there is opposition to our policy here in the United States.

But I want to ask this question: Does the Government of India, does the Government of Japan, do most of the non-Communist governments of Asia really want us out of Asia as he suggests? They do not. They do not.

Professor WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to suggest that our difficulty arises not so much from a particular complexity but from a general misconception. I would like to say in addition in the context of the news of the last few days and Mr. Bundy's absence that given enough attention to their critics and enough rational collaboration from their opponents, our leaders may end the Vietnam war short of disaster.

But sophisticated salvage operations are not enough. Our rivals being human beings may some day become irrational under such stress. And our own imagination is being contained and stunted within the limits of the past.

Our difficulty, it seems to me, is more subtle and more pervasive than even the resort to complexity we all acknowledge. We have not recognized and adapted to the triumph of an outlook and a policy formulated 70 years ago. The success of that policy as has been pointed out changed the reality upon which it was based. The success of that policy having changed the reality needs to be reconsidered, and I suggest that we need a new outlook and a new policy appropriate to the changed conditions, instead of struggles to operate successfully within the old framework.

## OPENNESS TO PROBLEMS FAVORED

Professor SCALABINO. It's a question of how you integrate a meaningful social, economic, political, and military program from the standpoint of maximizing the fundamental interests which you and the non-Communist

world hold in common. I don't think it's an either or basis.

I think that the Communists themselves have shown us that it isn't, because their approach is not an either or basis, and never has been. And this is the kind of problem—how do you develop the socioeconomic, political military integration that provides a base for political support, for economic development, and for some openness?

And I maintain that that's the most critical problem that we face, because it seems to me that we've done it successfully in some areas. Japan is a marvelous example of where the application of American and Japanese aid interrelated was successful.

There are areas where political stability has interacted with socioeconomic gains. And I think that these areas must be preserved and expanded in company with our allies and our potential allies.

When the President of India, for example, says that an Afro-Asian force might make some sense in the area of Vietnam and we say we're interested, and Peiping says it's ridiculous, it seems to me this is a kind of openness with which we should approach more and more of our problems.

I favor bringing the Asian and the African states into discussions of how peace can be developed and maintained and economic and social growth developed.

But I don't think ours is an adamant position. I don't think we've ever said or thought you could rely upon force alone. I don't think that that's the position that any thinking American today, however he may differ on the question of precisely of what we should do in Vietnam now.

Professor LINDSAY. I think this is a very valuable kind of meeting, and I think that a great many of the failures in both British and American policy have come from the Government failing to realize that a democratic country can only pursue an effective policy on the basis of an informed public opinion. And I think a great many mistakes have arisen from failure to produce one.

Then I think on that what it does seem to me that a lot of this trouble has come from failure to discuss the issues involved very much sooner. That if I look, I think, at most of the remarks of the speakers on the other side, it seems to me they all depend on a complete refusal to face what is a basically fairly new problem—how does one deal with the Leninist technique of spreading totalitarian control? I mean you had it in some extent actually with German infiltration in the Balkans in the 1930's.

But I think you do have to say what you do with the problem when you have a small determined minority who are perfectly prepared to use force and terrorism to get themselves in power. And it does seem to me that the American political scientists have far too much thought in terms of the kind of society in which things work through elections where it's one man, one vote, and haven't nearly enough thought about the problem of how you deal with a kind of society where your great majority are comparatively uninterested in politics and where a determination, where a small determined and forceful minority has a power completely out of proportion to their numbers.

Now the other point I think they've refused to face. This actually was put by one of the Australian Social Democrats a long time ago when he said if you're playing chess all right you keep to the rules as long as your opponent does, but if you know perfectly well that once your opponent starts to lose he will just knock over the table, then you have to think out new rules.

So it does seem to me that you have to begin by thinking of how do you deal with this kind of problem, and I might just cite, I think, a very clear case is the case of Malaya. Here you again you had a deter-

mined minority and I think if you go back and look at the papers as of about 1950 you will find people saying very much the same as this is right just now, now here is a popular movement which it is wrong to oppose. But I think it was perfectly clear after the event this power depended on terrorism. Once you had the organization which broke that terrorism, Malaya has become in fact one of the more successful Asian countries with a government which does in fact have a fair amount of support.

And so I feel perhaps the basic failure in American policy has been failure to develop the ideas of the Declaration of Independence, of governments owing their just powers to the consent of the governed. And to go on to say that a government which relies to maintain its power on terrorism, on keeping—on prevention of discussion, on keeping its people from any access to information, thereby proves that it does not represent the people.

## TRUTH FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Professor MILLET. This is a serious moment. And we're here in search of truth. And much has been said about many truths—one has been left out of account. I should like to say a little about that.

Behind all these high issues of international politics and hegemony of great states and international balance of power, there lies the Vietnamese truth. The truth for Vietnam; which for the Vietnamese people is a very bitter truth indeed.

Scalapino has said Communists do not ask for elections. Let us not forget it was the Vietminh who expected elections in 1956. And I wish merely to read from the program of the National Liberation Front of 1960, second article:

"Abolish the present constitution set up by the servile dictatorial Vietminh administration, carry out universal suffrage to elect a new national assembly." That was the NLF position in 1960. It has not changed.

Professor SCALABINO. I'm surprised that someone would say here that terror on our side accounts for all that happens in Vietnam.

And beyond that—on that particular point—I cannot comment more, except to say that as I tried to make clear at the outset, I think this is an enormously complicated problem. There has been terrorism on both sides. There have been many injustices, many killings on both sides.

To try to establish where the balance of terror lies, would, I think, be exceedingly difficult, but it seems to me clear that every observer of the Vietcong region has referred to a variety of techniques that range from persuasion to coercion. He has referred to the taking of young men for military service with or without their leave, and the government has done the same thing.

This is not a situation in which you can demarcate the good guys from the bad guys in these absolutist terms. And I think it's fairly clear that when I talked about Vietnam elections what the question I really raised was this: How can you have meaningful free elections unless opponents have full access to mass media or at least sufficient access to get their position expressed?

Professor FISHER. Mr. Chairman, colleagues. Professor Kahin and Professor Scalapino began this discussion on a high and responsible level with able and solidly grounded analyses. I see my role as a panelist as the only member of this panel who has lived and worked extensively in Vietnam, to try to set forth a few facts with respect to the country whose continuing agony is our reason for assembling here today.

I think we should keep in mind that there are very few blacks or whites in the Vietnamese situation. There are many shades of gray. We, as scholars, should strive for accuracy and wherever it is possible, for precision. I don't think we should succumb to

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the very natural inclination to oversimplify and thereby reduce to the absurd what is a very difficult and complex problem area.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Finally, Mr. President, on Monday, the New York Times carried a short article by Max Frankel discussing the future of meetings on the Vietnam issue, and what form such meetings should take. I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**FUTURE OF THE TEACH-IN—MEETING ON VIETNAM RAISES QUESTION: WHAT FORM SHOULD SUCH PROTEST TAKE?**

(By Max Frankel)

WASHINGTON, May 16.—The teach-in attained tenure here this weekend. It became repeatable, accountable, and probably permanent.

What began as an academic roadshow at the University of Michigan 8 weeks ago suddenly blossomed into a bigtime production of scholars and officials debating Vietnam policy a mile from the White House and before a huge radio and television audience.

There is a lively little controversy here about whether the all-night campus debates and protests had forced the Johnson administration to show concern instead of contempt for its academic critics. Some of the teach-in sponsors believe that they not only provoked recognition but also nudged the policymakers toward a greater interest in negotiations.

But one of the many paradoxes about the event is that McGeorge Bundy, Walt W. Rostow, and a few other intellectuals in Government were chiefly responsible for its success and public notice.

Mr. Bundy, the President's Special Adviser for National Security Affairs and a former Harvard dean, had been telling friends that he simply had to take on the scholars because "these are my people." Even in disappointing the crowd by withdrawing at the last minute for a secret trip to the Dominican Republic, he paid tribute to the teach-in and undertook for the Government an obligation to participate.

A PROPAGANDA BARGAIN

Thus it was only with the blessing of the administration they condemn for secrecy that the teachers and scholars were suddenly thrust before a national audience and given the decade's greatest propaganda bargain—national impact for an investment of \$20,000 to \$30,000.

Probably not since Nikita Khrushchev took on Soviet painters and poets have a group of intellectuals been hurtled so swiftly into the political arena. The difference, of course, is that here the critics have been encouraged to organize and they left Washington tonight determined to keep the institution alive.

This has raised the question of whether yesterday's breakfast-to-midnight talkfest generated more heat or light, and, indeed, whether teach-ins to come should be sober sessions of scholarly inquiry or long and loud protest rallies. The issue remains unsettled.

In conferring respectability upon the teach-in, the administration also demanded responsibility, a fair balance of points of view with scholars as well as officials on its side, to avoid the appearance of a Government at war with academe.

In practice, this balance had the effect of blunting the criticisms. Probably more words were uttered against the administration than for it, and it seemed doubtful that any significant number of participants or listeners altered their points of view.

But the debate no doubt demonstrated to many emotional critics that the issues in

Vietnam were extremely complex and that honest disagreement about them was inevitable. It probably supplied all sides with new ammunition and left a record of interesting controversy that could stimulate such additional and less hectic discussion.

The day sponsors of the teach-in, however, contend that any all day or all night assembly, by its very occurrence, is an expression of disquiet and protest, not just of curiosity. They say they do not know whether they represent a majority of those on campus, but insist that the administration does not know, either.

The desire for debate, for officials to defend their assumptions and actions in Vietnam, and to respond to intelligent criticism, they maintain, is widespread. And that desire, they contend, springs from many shades of discontent and will make the teach-in a political instrument.

To observers here, most of the organizers and audiences appeared to be motivated by much more than the subtleties of Vietnam policy.

A DISTRUST IS SEEN

In many remarks and questions there lurked distrust and hostility toward the Government itself. Mr. Bundy was the preferred official spokesman because others from the campus seemed really to want to ask, "Et tu, Brute?" They were uneasy about the use of force in international affairs, suspicious of the administration's claims of noble and peaceful purpose. Few were willing to await the explanation for Mr. Bundy's withdrawal before imputing dishonorable motives to him.

There was evidence of a still wider gulf between the Capital and the campus. The administration's critics plainly doubted that any intelligence and imagination was at work on foreign policies here.

The same liberal forces that once clamored for firm Presidential leadership now feared it and pleaded for Congress to give voice and shape to an opposition.

And there may have appeared a gulf between generations. Increasingly, administration supporters found themselves recalling the dangers of American inaction before World War II and the successful resistance to Soviet expansion after the war, while many of the younger critics could not or would not remember or accept the analogies of the 1930's and 1950's for the 1960's.

If this distance of time and attitude can be narrowed, then the teach-in movement will justify itself even if it does not solve the crisis in Vietnam from which it sprang.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY DIVISION OF FORESTRY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on May 8, I was the guest speaker at the annual banquet of the West Virginia University School of Forestry at Morgantown. I spoke to the approximately 250 prospective forestry graduates and faculty members on forestry research as a tool needed in the development of industries using wood as a primary raw material.

Also present was Dr. W. C. Percival, director of forestry, College of Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics, Division of Forestry, West Virginia University, to present a brief summary of the forestry school highpoints for 1964-65. Dr. Percival's realization of the tremendous importance of timber as one of our Nation's basic raw materials makes him a sincerely dedicated advocate of forestry research and qualifies him well for his duties as an educator and as a member of the West Virginia State Board of Registration for Foresters. The State

board acts to license and register foresters in the State.

Dr. Percival also serves as a member of the Governor's Committee on Wood Utilization, which was created to further the development of the forest industry in West Virginia.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point Dr. Percival's remarks on the evening of May 8.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FORESTRY SCHOOL HIGH POINTS FOR 1964-65

In the development of any growing enterprise, there are so many difficulties, and disappointments, and failures that it is worth while to take a moment occasionally to look for any signs of progress and success. When we started to do this 2 years ago, we were so pleasantly surprised that the attempt has been repeated.

Surely the most spectacular accomplishment of the year has been the construction of the new forestry building on the Evansdale campus. This building will provide the West Virginia's forestry school with excellent facilities for education and research in hardwoods. The climate and soils of our State produce the best hardwoods in America for the building, beautification, and furnishing of homes. Therefore the new building has been designed for education and research in the production and use of Appalachian hardwoods for home construction, beautification, and furniture.

West Virginia's beautiful forests, mountains and rivers and our State's location in the midst of this densely populated East makes it particularly useful and available for recreational purposes. Such use of West Virginia's forest resources may be developed concurrently and in harmony with their industrial development. Such usage is often called multiple use of forests and is a well established principle of forest management. Our new building was designed with this principle of multiple use in mind. Undergraduate, graduate and research facilities are being finished now for forest recreation, forest wildlife, and mountain stream fisheries which are considered of equal importance with industrial forestry in this development of West Virginia's natural resources.

An aspect of the construction of this building which is a high point of interest is the contribution of paneling lumber by West Virginia's hardwood manufacturers. They have provided various kinds and grades of hardwood panel stock sufficient for more than 40 rooms. This will not only beautify the classrooms and offices; it will furnish a continuous exhibit of West Virginia woods for beautification of interiors.

This expression of interest and friendship by West Virginia's hardwood mill operators is deeply appreciated.

Last fall the registration of the largest entering class in our history boosted our undergraduate enrollment to the new high of 288. This makes this school the ninth in size of student body among the 45 schools of forestry in America. Only New York, Michigan, Minnesota, and North Carolina have larger forestry schools east of the Rocky Mountains.

The number of students in our new graduate program is also increasing. There are 14 which have been accepted for specialized study in silviculture, forest mensuration, wood science and technology, wildlife management, and forest economics.

During the past year our faculty has been enlarged by the addition of Dr. John R. Hamilton, wood anatomist; Mr. David Groom, specialist in wood machining and finishing; Dr. David E. White, forestry economist; and

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Mr. William Kidd, extension specialist in forest management.

Among the more notable developments in the school has been its new curriculums. Because the new forestry building will give opportunities for research and graduate studies, curriculums leading to these studies have been developed. A wood science curriculum stressing mathematical studies was developed for the preparation of capable students for graduate work in wood technology also for direct transfer into graduate programs in the engineering fields. Our wood industries curriculum also provides for direct transfer of graduates into graduate school in the college of commerce. A forest science curriculum has been developed and approved which stresses biological studies and prepares for graduate work in many fields such as silviculture, forest physiology, forest pathology, etc.

A most important development to provide for this expansion has been the increase in funds. Increases in teaching funds have been helpful. Of great importance has been the creation of a State forestry research fund without which the above developments in research and graduate work would have been impossible. A Federal fund for forestry research, resulting from the McIntire-Stennis Act has been of tremendous assistance. For all the help received from many friends we owe a large debt of gratitude.

Now to cap this year's achievements the forestry club's woodsmen's teams brought back the trophy ax after facing the stiffest competition from New York and Penn State. This makes it a good year.

W. C. PIRCIVAL.

#### NEO-ISOLATIONISM OR ENLIGHTENED INTERNATIONALISM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, in yesterday's New York Times magazine, there was an article entitled "Isolationism Again—with a Difference," written by Prof. Henry F. Graff, of Columbia University. The author asserts that sweeping the United States is a new wave of isolationism, exemplified by the writings of Walter Lippmann and the utterances of such Members of Congress as Senators FULBRIGHT, MANSFIELD, CHURCH, AIKEN, JACKSON, MORSE, GRUENING, and myself.

I find the thesis of this article preposterous. It seems to me that Professor Graff has labeled as isolationists, some of the most internationally minded Members of the Senate and one of the Nation's most internationally minded and highly respected columnists.

I have replied to Mr. Graff's article in a letter to the editor of the New York Times magazine. I ask unanimous consent that both Mr. Graff's article and my answer be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and the letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ISOLATIONISM AGAIN—WITH A DIFFERENCE

(By Henry F. Graff)

Even as American commitments expand in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, the Nation is hearing an insistent call to withdraw from full involvement in the military and political processes of the world. The unadorned truth is that isolationism is reviving in our midst. Its advocates are going by the name of neoisolationists—to distinguish them from, but associate them with, their fellows of the 1930's and early 1940's.

The word "isolationist" has somewhat the sound of an epithet, like the word "apeaser" or "monarchist." The connotation results from the history of the 1930's, when to be an isolationist was to seem to say that it made no difference to this country whether or not the Fascist dictators, and especially Hitler, had their way. Moreover, isolationists, like appeasers and monarchists, turned out to be bucking the tide of history—often a cause for an adverse judgment by posterity.

The advocates of neoisolationism are suggesting that the day of globalism ought to be done, that the cold war cannot be waged everywhere in the world, and that coexistence with communism must be accepted with equanimity. A few years ago such sentiments might have sounded impractical to the point of being unpatriotic. Yet today they are being expressed by some of the most respected and well-informed public leaders.

One of these is Walter Lippmann, indisputably the doyen of newspaper columnists, who clearly is blowing the pitch pipe. He recently wrote:

"We have since the end of the Second World War been committed far beyond our primary vital interests and far beyond our military and political reach.

"If it is said that this is isolationism, I would say yes. It is isolationism if the study of our own vital interests and a realization of the limitations of our power is isolationism. It is isolationism as compared with the globalism which became fashionable after the Second World War."

Sentiment akin to this is also present on Capitol Hill. J. W. FULBRIGHT, the chairman of the august Senate Foreign Relations Committee, began the discussion almost a year ago in a now-celebrated speech called "Old Myths and New Realities." In it he urged the country "to start thinking some unthinkable thoughts." Among the shibboleths he assailed were these: that "the Communist bloc is a monolith"; that the hostility of Red China is permanent; that Fidel Castro is more than a passing nuisance.

FULBRIGHT was doing nothing less than calling into question the axioms on which the widespread dispersal of U.S. military power has been predicated.

At the time FULBRIGHT was uttering his words, he seemed to be hankering for a debate on the relationship between our power and our policy. But if he generated none, he has not been without sympathetic company among colleagues. Senator GEORGE AIKEN, Republican, of Vermont, for instance, puts his feelings in a general lament: "We're trying to police the world, and we can't do it." The latest evidence of this comes from the Senate Subcommittee on National Security, under the chairmanship of HENRY JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington. In a caustic memorandum it reproaches public officials who "verbally commit the Nation to policies and programs far beyond our capabilities."

The conjunction of the stepped-up war in Vietnam and the intervention in the Dominican Republic is helping to focus sharply the arguments for retrenchment in our worldwide commitments. Senator GEORGE McGOVERN, Democrat, of South Dakota, for instance, wants the United States to go to the conference table with the North Vietnamese, even without waiting until the military situation is more favorable to us. He is supported in varying degrees by other Senators, including Democrats WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, and FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho. Even MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, the majority leader, expresses criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The landing of troops in the Caribbean is generally, though not unanimously, supported. On the Senate floor, for example, MORSE asked in obvious perturbation:

"Have we lost our minds? \* \* \* Have we become militarily power drunk?"

What has happened that men like these, who only recently were advocates of U.S. involvement in the world, should now seem to shrink from its full implications? And is it a turnabout that EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, the minority leader, who was once prominently identified with the isolationist wing of the Republican Party, is now saying that talk of negotiations under pressure in southeast Asia is "simply a proposal to run up the white flag"?

It may be too early to say that a debate on isolationism versus interventionism is at last shaping up. But a cast of characters is waiting in the wings. Their arguments, for the moment, bear chiefly on Vietnam. Nevertheless, the points they make are adaptable, and can be applied elsewhere—as no doubt they will be when the crisis there is finally over.

The neoisolationists represent an illustrious historical heritage, but their line of descent is not direct or pure. In the 1930's isolationism meant to many simply letting the rest of the world go hang or, more politely, it bespoke a go-it-alone policy for the United States. It was deeply rooted in a revulsion from war, which found expression independently of the Nation's security needs. Senator Robert A. Taft, a leading isolationist, said in 1940 that for this country to become involved in the fighting would be "even worse than a German victory." And Senator Burton K. Wheeler, of Montana, another strident voice of isolationism, was saying: "I will never vote to send a single boy to fight upon foreign soil unless this Nation is attacked."

The neoisolationists are not guided by such an impractical though laudable fear of war. They know what their predecessors learned at great cost: That wars cannot be prevented or avoided unilaterally. They prefer to think that if we must fight we ought to fight on our terms—at a place and time of our choosing. The war in Vietnam is not the right war; it does not affect our vital interests.

Nevertheless, there is running away from hostilities as such. As Lippmann writes: "Our people have shown in three wars that they can take it if they have to." When they do not have to, they ought not to edge closer to it.

Second, the isolationism of the thirties was notably and implacably anti-Communist. Taft declared unequivocally in 1941: "The victory of communism in the world would be far more dangerous to the United States than a victory of fascism."

The neoisolationists' response to communism is less intractable and more complex. Today Senator FULBRIGHT is stating: "The attribution of an unalterable will and constancy to Soviet policy has been a serious handicap to our own policy. \* \* \* We have overestimated the ability of the Soviets to pursue malevolent aims without regard to time or circumstances and, in so doing, we have underestimated our own ability to influence Soviet behavior."

Another difference between the old isolationists and the new is the attitude toward the shape and quality of American power. Senator Wheeler was, like other isolationists of his day, hostile to peacetime conscription. The selective service bill was a principal whipping boy. Its enactment, Wheeler declared in a nationwide radio address in 1940, would constitute a menace to American liberties.

"If this bill passes," he shouted, "it will slit the throat of the last democracy still living. It will accord Hitler his greatest and cheapest victory. On the headstone of American democracy he will inscribe 'Here lies the foremost victim of the war of nerves.'"

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trmination which the 15th amendment was designed to uproot. No such influence is charged here. On the other hand, a literacy test may be unconstitutional on its face. In *Davis v. Schenck*, 81 F. Supp. 872, aff'd 336 U.S. 933, the test was the citizen's ability to "understand and explain" an article of the Federal Constitution. The legislative setting of that provision and the great discretion it vested in the registrar made clear that a literacy requirement was merely a device to make racial discrimination easy. We cannot make the same inference here. The present requirement, applicable to members of all races, is that the prospective voter "be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English language." That seems to us to be one fair way of determining whether a person is literate, not a calculated scheme to lay snares for the citizen. Certainly we cannot condemn it on its face as a device unrelated to the desire of North Carolina to raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, in the case of *Carrington v. Rash*, 380 U.S. 65, Carrington had moved to the State of Texas while a member of the armed services and established his domicile in that State with the intent to make his permanent residence there.

A provision of the Texas constitution prohibited servicemen from voting except in the place of his residence at the time he entered the service.

The Supreme Court held that a State can impose reasonable residence requirements, but that under the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, Texas could not prevent a man from registering merely because he was in the Armed Forces. The Court discussed a State's power under the Constitution to provide qualifications for voting.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt from the opinion of the Court in the Carrington case be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## EXCERPT FROM CARRINGTON v. RASH

Texas has unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the availability of the ballot. *Pope v. Williams*, 193 U.S. 621. There can be no doubt either of the historic function of the States to establish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Constitution, other qualifications for the exercise of the franchise. Indeed, "[t]he States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised." *Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd.*, 360 U.S. 45, 50. Compare *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299; *Ex parte Yarbrough*, 110 U.S. 651. "In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution." *Pope v. Williams*, *supra* at 632.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I hope, before the debate is over, that Senators will make an effort to read and study some of the amendments that will be offered by opponents of the bill.

As stated earlier, we from the South will attempt to propose amendments in an effort to bring the bill within the purview of the Constitution. I feel confident

that if we are successful in doing so—and, as a matter of fact, if we had been successful in adopting the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE] today, and the amendment offered several days ago by the distinguished Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], we from the South would not be holding up a vote on this measure. However, insofar as I am concerned, and I believe that I speak for the majority of Senators who oppose the bill, so long as the bill remains in its present form, we do not propose to vote on the measure.

We are hopeful that in the near future we shall be able to propose further amendments to the end that Senators may see the light.

I have no doubt that Senators would see the light if only we could set aside the politics which are involved in the measure. There is no doubt in my mind that whenever issues of this kind become involved in politics, the individuals dealing with those issues seem to lose their sense of reason.

There are many good lawyers in the Senate. If only a study of the amendments that we propose were made in the light of the Constitution, I have no doubt that individual Senators would vote for those amendments. If that were to happen, I have no doubt that debate on the measure could be completed in a short period of time.

Mr. President, I have spoken longer than I anticipated speaking. I believe my good friend, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROUTY] desires to speak. I told the Senator that I would speak for probably 2 hours. However, I have been speaking now for almost 3 hours. If I have inconvenienced the Senator, I apologize.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS  
TO INHIBIT FULL DISCUSSION OF  
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, it is always a pleasure to listen to the Senator from Louisiana.

Last Saturday, at the Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington, a group entitled, "The Inter-University Committee for Public Hearings on Vietnam" sponsored what it called a "National Teach-in on the Vietnam War." This program resulted from the labors of a preparatory committee based at the University of Michigan, and the sponsors included some of the foremost scholars of our Nation.

The purposes of this program were announced as these: To focus the attention of the American people upon our involvement in Vietnam; to examine the process of decisionmaking in foreign affairs to reevaluate the assumptions and goals underlying our foreign policy; and to explore and examine critically the various policy choices facing the President in his conduct of foreign affairs.

The main event of this meeting was to have been a debate between a panel headed by President Johnson's chief ad-

viser on foreign policy, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and a panel of critics of the present administration's policy.

From what I have been reading in the papers, some earlier teach-ins of this sort held around the country departed radically from the standards of intellectual discourse which we have a right to expect from those who have the responsibility of educating America's young men and women. Perhaps in order to avoid the deficiencies of these earlier meetings—many of which reportedly degenerated into emotional and ill informed outbursts against President Johnson's actions in southeast Asia—meticulous care was shown by the organizing committee in guaranteeing that Saturday's program would be a full, fair, and free discussion conducted on the highest and most responsible level of academic inquiry. I have been told that in negotiating the format of Mr. Bundy's announced appearance, the sponsoring committee made 30 different changes in their suggested program. This was done to satisfy Mr. Bundy's desire for absolutely fair treatment for critics and supporters alike. This Mr. Bundy acknowledged when he said in a statement Saturday:

The preliminary arrangements for this particular meeting, so far as I have knowledge of them, have been fair to a fault.

With the prospect of a truly informative high level clash of opinion on our Vietnam policy, over 2,000 people were present in the Sheraton ballroom at 2 o'clock Saturday afternoon. National radio and television was on hand. A telephone linkage system was set up to pipe the debate to over 140 colleges and organizations across the country.

What these people did not know, according to the Sunday Star, was that at 10 Saturday morning, two of the program's sponsors had been called to the White House. There they were handed a statement to be read at 2 p.m., which said that Mr. Bundy would not be present due to unspecified "other duties."

The White House would not let this information be released until the opening of the program—after more than 2,000 people had paid \$2 apiece to get into the hall.

Nor, apparently, did Mr. Bundy arrange to send a substitute. Could it have been, Mr. President, that such a momentous crisis was brewing Saturday afternoon that the White House, the Department of State, and the Defense Department could not produce even one spokesman to defend their policies in Vietnam to an audience, live and hooked-in, or tens of thousands of persons? If it was such an overwhelming crisis, Mr. President, I regret to observe that the leaders of Congress were not notified of it, nor were they invited to the White House for a top-secret session. If it was not a great crisis, I believe the administration owes these thousands of people, and indeed the millions of Americans who were eager to read the accounts in their daily papers and hear and see the proceedings on their radio and television sets, an honest explanation.

The administration may have erred when it permitted Mr. Bundy to accept

the professors' invitation—and I am inclined to believe that it did. But once Mr. Bundy agreed to appear, regardless of his professed qualifications regarding emergency duties, he should have made every possible effort to be present. When this became impossible, he should have arranged for a substitute spokesman to take the Government's position. Barring that, he should have made the prospective absence of any administration spokesman known to the public as soon as it became known to him—at 10 Saturday morning instead of 2 in the afternoon. And even if he did not do all these things, he should at least have sent to the sponsoring committee a courteous note of apology.

I say a courteous note of apology, Mr. President, because I have read the actual statement released by Mr. Bundy and I for one find it in very poor taste. Once having agreed to appear, wisely or unwisely, Mr. Bundy made a commitment to his hosts. The least he could have done, when pressing and legitimate duties prevented his fulfilling that commitment, would have been to express sincere regrets. For this he could have been reasonably excused.

But the statement Mr. Bundy chose to place in the hands of the sponsors for reading at the meeting cannot, Mr. President, be termed a courteous note of apology. In that note, following the expression of regrets, Mr. Bundy offers the following gratuitous observations:

1. It may be true—although I have no firsthand knowledge—that some of your meetings on Vietnam have failed to meet the standards appropriate to university and college discussion.

2. It may also be true—and I have thought so once or twice myself—that a few of those who feel strongly about the situation in Vietnam have been more interested in pressure upon the administration than in fair discussion with its representatives.

3. The American people know that those who are protesting are only a small minority—indeed a small minority—of American teachers and students.

4. I recognize the entire sincerity of the great majority of those who now disagree with our policy in Vietnam.

5. I trust that the discussion this afternoon will not turn upon charge and counter-charge against the motives of those with whom we disagree.

Now, Mr. President, let us look at these statements a little more closely.

In the first place, Mr. Bundy links the defects of earlier meetings with the sponsors of the Saturday meeting, thus tending to bring them into an unfavorable light—this, though he admits that the arrangements committee had been "fair to a fault," and though, so I am told, he himself approved the panelists, both pro and con, in advance.

In the second place, Mr. Bundy attempts to imply that some of those engaged in the program could be expected to disregard the standards of fair discussion.

In the third place, Mr. Bundy attempts to minimize the importance of the views of the sponsoring committee by suggesting that the great majority of American teachers and students believe otherwise—a sort of truth-by-numbers proposition. I frankly hope, and believe, that the great

majority of the American people do not share the views of the professors who organized this committee. But I do not like to see minority views assailed merely because they are views of a minority. To espouse such a doctrine would certainly not aid the cause of the Republican Party to which I belong, currently a minority in Congress.

In the fourth place, Mr. Bundy, while recognizing the sincerity of most of his critics, slyly implies that many critics—perhaps the ones he is addressing—are not sincerely motivated.

And in the fifth place he voices his hope that the panelists of the day would not question the motives of those with whom they disagreed—in my opinion a most gratuitous comment.

I wish to make it very clear, Mr. President, that I am in no way associated with this national teach-in program. I have never had any dealings with its sponsors. From what I have read of their opinions, I am sure I would take strong exception to many of their suggestions on Vietnam policy. Three years ago, I cast the only vote against the President's Cuban crisis resolution on the ground that it is weak and mealy-mouthed. A week ago Thursday, with the President's request for \$700 million in additional funds pending before this body, I stood on this floor and called for a permanent, continuing declaration of American will to counter the aggressive designs of communism. "When the cause is just, the threat clear, and the implications of irresolution ominous," I said on that occasion, "our adversaries must be left with no shred of doubt that the American people stand behind their Government in a swift, effective defense of freedom." I have long felt that the forces of the free world should have been permitted to press to victory in Korea, and not forced to accept the moral defeat of stalemate against aggression. When Communist elements maneuver to seize control of a revolution, such as the present one in the Dominican Republic, the President of the United States will find me backing his decision to commit U.S. power to halt the spread of communism.

No, Mr. President, I am sure that my views on American policy toward Communist aggression would find few if any supporters among the committee of professors responsible for this teach-in meeting. I do not rise to defend theirs. But I am alarmed at what I perceive as an attempt by this administration to confound and discredit sincere opponents of administration policy by such recent actions and statements as those of Mr. Bundy.

Fundamental to the conduct of foreign affairs in a democracy is the right of the people to know—to know the facts of the situation, insofar as those facts can be revealed without endangering legitimate national security, to know the policy their government is following, and to know the true reasons for that policy.

The President of the United States must take the lead in foreign policy—on that we all agree. On occasion he will have to make a decision that is politically unpopular—a precedent established by President Washington in his

acceptance of the Jay Treaty. But if the executive branch has certain prerogatives in the field of foreign policy, it also has the solemn responsibility to make available to the American people the essential information on which rational discussion can be based. To abdicate this responsibility is not the way of a democracy, Mr. President, it is the way of autocracy.

Should anyone desire an example, Mr. President, I need only point to Soviet Russia; or to the more extreme practices of Red China. Americans of all shades of opinion rightfully deplore the governments of those lands for their rigid suppression of the facts of international relations, for their twisted distortions of world politics, for their vigilant efforts to keep the truth from their people. When the day comes and we must all hope it will, that the professors of Russia can stage a national "teach-in" in the shadow of the Kremlin, then the prospects for a genuine peace in the world will be much brighter than they are today.

Today, Mr. President, there is widespread belief that this administration is deliberately concealing the hard truth from the American people. The platform of the Republican Party, adopted at San Francisco last July, reflected much sentiment at that time when it said:

This administration has adopted the policies of news management and unjustifiable secrecy, in the guise of guarding the Nation's security; it has shown a contempt of the people to know the truth.

In my opinion, Mr. President, the performance of McGeorge Bundy and the administration last Saturday reflects that same contempt of the people to know the truth.

Is our policy in southeast Asia so indefensible that no one in Mr. Bundy's absence could meet the attacks of earnest critics? Is the administration so unsure of itself and of the basic soundness of its Vietnam policy, that it must, through one of its most senior spokesmen, attempt to cast discredit and impute insincerity to the sponsoring committee of this great nationwide debate on Vietnam?

During his remarks criticizing present Vietnam policy, Prof. George Kahin, of Cornell University, said Saturday:

Finally, for those many Americans who still regard full public discussion of vitally important national issues as essential to our brand of democracy, there is a particularly disquieting aspect of this situation. Realizing as they do that an informed public discussion requires access to all the relevant facts, they can only be deeply disturbed when a spokesman for the newspaper editors of this country feels compelled to state, as he did last month, that the American "press in Vietnam faces stronger restrictions than it ever has in wartime" and that we are getting "contradictions, doubletalk, and half-truths" from the Government concerning the situation in Vietnam. And surely Americans have grounds for concern when the New York Times can editorialize as it did not long afterwards, that "high ranking representatives of Government in Washington and in Saigon 'have so' obscured, confused, or distorted news from Vietnam" or have made such "fatuously erroneous evaluations about

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the course of the war" that the credibility of the U.S. Government has been sacrificed.

Regardless of his personal views on Vietnam policy, Professor Kahin has touched an exceedingly sore point. A growing number of Americans, including many very respectable and influential persons, are beginning to lose faith in the credibility of the U.S. Government.

Let me quote, too, from a perceptive article published in the spring 1965 issue of Columbia University Forum. It was written by Arnold Beichman, a special correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. Mr. Beichman says:

On the afternoon of July 14, 1964, a press conference was convened at U.S. military headquarters in Saigon, known as MAC-V. The spokesman was an American general who still cannot be identified. I was there; so were a dozen other reporters. Purpose of the briefing, not immediately apparent: to confuse the reporters, the folks back home, Congress, the Republicans convening at the Cow Palace. The Vietnamese were saying that there was a good deal of Communist infiltration from North Vietnam. True or not? To confirm meant a corollary question—what did the United States intend to do about it? To deny meant an entirely different question—were our Vietnamese allies lying and if so why? Result:

Associated Press, Saigon, July 14: "A ranking U.S. military spokesman denied Tuesday that there were indications regular North Vietnamese Army units were moving into South Vietnam."

United Press International, Saigon, July 14: "The headquarters of the U.S. military here announced tonight that Communist North Vietnam had accelerated its infiltration into the south and that the stepped-up Communist activity has introduced a certain amount of danger in the four provinces nearest North Vietnam."

Outright contradiction of this sort is rare; it is even rarer, however, to discover the truth so soon after the untruth. When, last February 28, the State Department released a white paper detailing North Vietnamese incursions south of the 17th parallel, it cited as evidence the very source of Vietnamese intelligence that the U.S. military spokesman was pooh-poohing at the July 14 press conference.

I recall, too, Mr. President, a number of euphoric statements by American generals in Vietnam, Secretary McNamara, and others, to the effect that American troops in Vietnam would be reduced by the end of 1965, that the war was swiftly turning in favor of the Government of South Vietnam, and so on. I cannot believe that men as well traveled and observant as these top administration spokesmen could seriously entertain such enthusiastically optimistic views about what has consistently appeared to be a deteriorating situation. Such statements are not a contribution but a disservice to the building of public support for American policy here at home.

I, for one, Mr. President, have always advocated stiff resistance to Communist aggression, whether in Cuba, Berlin, Vietnam, Korea, or elsewhere. I am not one of those who have issued bitter attacks on President Johnson's actions in Vietnam—although I do not wish to be interpreted as endorsing each and every move he has made.

But even if I stood in enthusiastic 100 percent agreement with the President on Vietnam, I could not but be seriously

concerned about this growing belief—foolishly magnified by the administration—that the U.S. Government is no longer a credible source of information for the American people.

Let us make no mistake about it, Mr. President, the American people have a right to know.

They have a right to hear our national policies attacked and defended.

They have a right to evaluate various courses of action, and to express their preferences. If it ever becomes otherwise, Mr. President, God save America.

It is the people of America, and not Mr. Johnson or Mr. Bundy or Mr. McNamara or Mr. Rusk, who must pay the bills of war. It is the people of America who must provide the dollars and the sweat and the blood when our fighting men go into battle. It is the mothers and fathers of America who must face the prospect of that heartbreaking telegram from the Defense Department, which begins "We regret to inform you."

The people of America are not sheep, to be shorn of their wool and carved up into lamb chops at the decree of our top policymakers. They must have a voice, they must have the facts, they must have the opportunity to play their proper part in the crucial decisions that face our Nation. By confusing the press, distorting some facts and ignoring others, by subtle efforts to discredit its critics, this administration has come perilously close to losing the confidence of the American people at a time when that confidence is most sorely needed.

Whatever may have been said about Senator Goldwater in the election campaign last fall, in my heart I know one thing: as President, he would not have been afraid to level with the American people who elected him. Today, I can only say that I sincerely fear that President Johnson does not appear to have the courage to lay all the facts on the line.

What is the danger, Mr. President? The danger is that an administration which loses the confidence of the American people will have extreme difficulty obtaining support for its policies—even if those policies, seen in full perspective, are wise and appropriate. When an administration loses the confidence of the people, the cries of its critics gain credence. In this case, the impassioned pleas of those who would have us retreat and withdraw before the Communist threat in Vietnam may well gain new adherents—not for the intrinsic validity of their views, which in my opinion is low, but from a revulsion against a distrusted administration that has embraced, however cautiously, an opposite policy of firmness and strength.

I believe, Mr. President, that an intellectually sound and cogent case may be made for a hard, tough, U.S. stance in southeast Asia. Were I a top policymaker in the executive branch, I should have no fear of taking such a policy to the people of the United States and appealing for their support. But under no circumstances, Mr. President, would I conceal the truth, confuse the facts, and assault the motives of those who opposed my views. To do so would be only to destroy, in the long run, the public sup-

port without which no policy, however sound, can survive.

I recognize well that in a group as large and diverse as the Inter-University Committee for Public Hearings on Vietnam there will be some whose support of and loyalty to the United States is open to question. But that is not of prime importance. What is important is that the American people have the opportunity to hear a calm, reasonable dialog on fundamental foreign policy decisions, decisions which they may ultimately be assessed for in tax dollars and blood. With only an occasional unfortunate exception, Saturday's teach-in program was a calm, rational debate on the future of American policy, a debate which I believe is a desirable and healthy thing in a democracy.

I can only hope, Mr. President, that the administration takes close note of the criticisms brought against its policy of limited news and limited debate on Vietnam—criticisms originating among the press, the academic community, and Congress, but now spreading to a larger segment of the public—and that it rededicates itself to a full, fair, free, and honest debate on a matter of such consequence to the people of our Nation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Bundy's statement to the professors on Saturday be printed at this point in the RECORD, along with an article from the Washington Sunday Star of May 16, 1965, by Mary McGrory, entitled "Ex-Dean Becomes Dropout," and an editorial from today's New York Times entitled "Lessons in Democracy."

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY MCGREGOR BUNDY, TO THE INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR A PUBLIC HEARING ON VIETNAM, MAY 15, 1965

I greatly regret that it is impossible for me to take part in the discussion this afternoon of our policy in Vietnam. I have looked forward to this meeting, and I hate to miss it. When I accepted your invitation, I did so with the warning that I might be unable to attend because of other duties. It gives me no pleasure that this warning has come true.

I regret my absence the more because I wholly disagree with those who have argued that it is inappropriate for a Government official to take part in a discussion of this kind. It may be true—although I have no firsthand knowledge—that some of your meetings on Vietnam have failed to meet the standards appropriate to university and college discussion. It may also be true—and I have thought so once or twice myself—that a few of those who feel strongly about the situation in Vietnam have been more interested in pressure upon the administration than in fair discussion with its representatives. But the preliminary arrangements for this particular meeting, so far as I have knowledge of them, have been fair to a fault. I am confident that the discussion this afternoon under the chairmanship of Professor Nagel will be a model of its kind. Members of the academic community and members of the administration share a deep interest in the encouragement of such fair and open discussion.

It has been argued that debate of this kind should be avoided because it can give encouragement to the adversaries of our country. There is some ground for this

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argument, since it is true that Communists have little understanding of the meaning of debate in a free society. The Chinese will continue to pretend—and perhaps in part to believe—that American policy is weaker because 700 faculty members have made a protest against our policy in Vietnam. The American people—whatever their opinion—know better. They know that those who are protesting are only a minority—indeed a small minority—of American teachers and students. They know also that even within that minority the great majority accept and respect the right and duty of the American administration to meet its constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The American people know that the real day of danger will come when we are afraid of any unpopular minority, or unwilling to reply to its voices. They understand what Communists cannot understand at all—that open discussion between our citizens and their Government is the central nervous system of our free society. We cannot let the propaganda of totalitarians divert us from our necessary arguments with one another—any more than we should let them be misled by such debates if we can help it.

I will not take your time in this brief message for a rehearsal of the policy of this administration on Vietnam. Let me take only a word to speak of our purpose there. That purpose is peace—for the people of Vietnam, the people of southeast Asia, and the people of the United States. We evidently differ on the choice of ways and means to peace, in what we all must recognize to be a complex, ugly and demanding situation. Those differences may go deep to the nature of the policies of Asia, to the legitimacy of force in the face of armed attack and to the true prospects and purposes of the people of Vietnam themselves.

But my own assessment is that what divides us is less than what unites us. None of us wants the war to be enlarged. All of us want a decent settlement. None of us wants other men to be forced under a totalitarian political authority. All of us seek a solution in which American troops can be honorably withdrawn. None of us—I hope—believes that these are easy goals. All of us—I trust—are prepared to be steadfast in the pursuit of our purposes.

I recognize the entire sincerity of the great majority of those who now disagree with our policy in Vietnam. I think many of these critics have been wrong in earlier moments of stress and danger, and I think many of them misunderstand the hard realities of this dangerous world. But their good faith and good intent are not in question—and on other issues at other times their efforts have been of great service to their country.

Having said this much, perhaps I can ask in return that these critics should recognize that the administration which now bears responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs does not admire force for its own sake, or "brinkmanship" of any sort. The purpose of its foreign policy—in Vietnam as elsewhere—is that diplomacy and power and progress and hope shall be held together in the service of the freedom of us all. So I trust that the discussion this afternoon will not turn upon charge and countercharge against the motives of those with whom we disagree. Let it turn instead upon analysis of the situation as it is and of choices for the future which can serve the purposes we share.

I repeat my apologies for my enforced absence, and I take comfort in the thought that I shall miss the meeting more than you will miss me.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, May 16, 1965]

EX-DEAN BECOMES DROPOUT—BUNDY CONSPICUOUS BY ABSENCE AT VIETNAM TEACH-IN  
(By Mary McGrory)

McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's foreign policy expert, has become the Nation's No. 1 dropout.

It's a curious fate for a former dean of Harvard, and his old colleagues at the national teach-in on the Vietnam war could not conceal their disappointment or their disapproval.

The general reaction in the Sheraton Park ballroom was akin to that which greets an opera manager's announcement just before curtain time that Maria Callas will not be singing "Carmen" after all.

Some of the students responded with a mild but unmistakable chorus of hisses and boos throughout the Bundy statement read by the session's moderator. Bundy's line, "I hate to miss it," drew mocking laughter from the crowd.

Throughout the afternoon, speculation ran around the hall. Not since Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY failed to go to Winston Churchill's funeral last winter has there been such a buzz about absenteeism.

Where was Bundy?

The White House would not say.

The Inter-University Committee for Public Hearings on Vietnam did not know.

Had the President needed him more at the White House? Was there a new crisis brewing?

"He said he had important business but did not say what it is," said a Russian professor from Sarah Lawrence. "I'm very sorry he did it."

"If he had shown up," said a bearded spectator, who is himself a dropout, "he would have been badly trounced."

One of the principal Johnson critics, George Kahin of Cornell University, where roving Ambassador Averell Harriman was booed last week when he tried to explain the Johnson line, said he would have something to say about Bundy's failure to appear, in 3 hours of discussion, however, he had not.

Bundy's place was taken manfully by a somewhat flustered administration proponent, Robert Scalapino, of the University of California. He purged himself with the audience by saying he had no idea what Bundy would have said. He obviously had done his homework, though, even if Dr. Kahin complained he had heard it all before.

On the fringes of the hall, it was suggested that perhaps the President had watched the morning proceeding on the educational television network and, becoming either bored or alarmed, had ordered his Special Assistant on National Security Affairs to cut class.

All in all, the teach-in boded no good for the possibility of negotiation between the administration and the universities.

President Johnson was represented at morning session by Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a former Harvard professor, and a staff member of the Kennedy administration. At the behest of Bundy, Schlesinger took time off from writing his biography of President Kennedy to reason with the professors.

He proved to be a dubious advocate, and if it had not been for the honor of the thing, President Johnson might have been just as glad if Schlesinger had not defended him.

For while Schlesinger approved in general of the course of U.S. action in South Vietnam, he slipped in so many barbs that his reservations intrigued the professors more than his endorsement.

They were, for instance, ecstatic about his

reprise on the celebrated and rankling line of Secretary of State Dean Rusk about "the gullibility of educated men."

"What about the gullibility of Secretaries of State?" asked Schlesinger, and there was a burst of applause.

Nor could the President have appreciated Schlesinger's left-handed pat on the head for his speech last Thursday on extending the larger life to the people of Vietnam. Schlesinger saw this as an answer to the Senate speech of his good friend, Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, of New York.

The President and Bundy may have had matters of much greater moment on their minds. If so, they had better enlighten the intellectuals, who did not, to borrow the inflammatory phrase from the famous Bundy letter to Washington University faculty members, "give them a very good mark."

[From the New York Times, May 17, 1965]  
LESSON IN DEMOCRACY

The academic community has given the American people—and their Government—a badly needed reminder that democratic discussion is both important and useful for the defense of democracy. Professors and students in all parts of the country spent most of Saturday listening in—by radio, television, and special telephone—on what was surely the most comprehensive and civilized public debate on the Vietnamese war in all the decade since the United States became involved in the conflict there.

The emergency trip to Santo Domingo which obliged McGeorge Bundy to cancel his talk deprived the White House of any spokesman with the prestige and intimate knowledge necessary for a full explanation of the administration's position. But the academicians on both sides conducted themselves with a dignity and respect for fact that contrasted favorably with the emotionalism that too often passes for discussion in foreign affairs among champions and critics of Government policy alike.

All that was lacking for a truly magnificent exhibition of how a democracy exchanges views was a spontaneous decision by that old schoolteacher, Lyndon B. Johnson, to pinch-hit for his absent aid. The President, speaking in the vein of his Johns Hopkins speech, would have done well for himself and his cause.

Nevertheless, it was refreshing after the sour remarks Secretary Rusk and other administration leaders had made about prior teach-ins on Vietnam to find Mr. Bundy saying in his message of regret that "open discussion between our citizens and their Government is the central nervous system of our free society."

Whether any large number of minds—young or old—were changed by the hundreds of thousands of words the debaters exchanged is less consequential than this reaffirmation of the right of all citizens in a democracy to participate in shaping official policy through the full and unhampered interchange of ideas. Nothing could do more to erase the distinction between our system and totalitarianism than the notion that the Government has a monopoly of wisdom and any questioning or criticism is subversive. The teach-ins have helped to keep that crucial distinction alive.

## ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today it

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stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**ORDER FOR LIMITED TIME FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow there be time for the transaction of routine morning business, and that the time not exceed the hour of 12:30.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**RECOGNITION OF SENATOR WILLIAMS OF DELAWARE TOMORROW**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that at the conclusion of the transaction of routine morning business tomorrow, the distinguished Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] will have the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**ADJOURNMENT**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in accordance with the previous order, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 52 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned, under the previous order, until tomorrow, Tuesday, May 18, 1965, at 12 o'clock meridian.

**NOMINATIONS**

Executive nominations received by the Senate May 17, 1965:

**EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION**

The following-named persons to be members of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:

Eileen Hernandez, of California, for the term expiring July 1, 1965.

Richard Graham, of Wisconsin, for the term expiring July 1, 1966.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., of New York, for the term expiring July 1, 1967.

Samuel C. Jackson, of Kansas, for the term expiring July 1, 1968.

Rev. Luther Holcomb, of Texas, for the term expiring July 1, 1969.

Eileen Hernandez, of California, for the term of 5 years expiring July 1, 1970. (Re-appointment.)

**IN THE ARMY**

The following-named officer under the provisions of title 10, United States Code,

section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

Maj. Gen. Marshall Sylvester Carter, O18359, U.S. Army, in the grade of lieutenant general.

The following-named officer under the provisions of title 10, United State Code, section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

Maj. Gen. George Robinson Mather, O18696, U.S. Army, in the grade of lieutenant general.

**CONFIRMATIONS**

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 17, 1965:

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Anthony M. Solomon, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

Leonard C. Meeker, of New Jersey, to be Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

George A. Morgan, of the District of Columbia, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Ivory Coast.

Mercer Cook, of Illinois, now Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Senegal, to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to The Gambia.

**PEACE CORPS**

Warren W. Wiggins, of Virginia, to be Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.

# Appendix

## Proposed Skip-Row Rule Change Threatens Ruin for Thousands of American Cottongrowers

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. WALTER ROGERS**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. ROGERS of Texas. Mr. Speaker, thousands of American cotton farmers will suffer a severe, and in some cases disastrous, economic blow if the Department of Agriculture places in effect its proposed rule change affecting cotton planted in skip-row patterns. The rule not only would result in reduced net income to cotton farmers but would bring the end to proven, sound conservation practices followed by a generation of Texas Panhandle and South Plains cotton farmers, as well as growers in many other areas of the Nation.

In addition, the new rule would disrupt current farming practices followed by grain sorghum producers in our Panhandle-Plains region, would serve to offset Government efforts to keep grain stocks in check, and would destroy the faith our farmers have in the wisdom of current farm policy objectives.

We are told that one of the objectives of current Agriculture Department policy is to provide opportunity for efficient family farmers to earn parity of income, that the Department seeks parity of income for all rural people, including new opportunity for small farmers. I find it impossible to reconcile these announced goals with the Department's proposed rule change affecting cotton when planted in skip-row patterns.

We are told that USDA officials feel that increased yields due to skip-row plantings have, in the words of a Department press release, "contributed substantially to the increase in cotton production." The Department does not state the obvious truth that other modern-day farming practices—including irrigation, improved fertilizers, and insecticides—also contribute to the increased productivity of the American cottongrower. But only skip-row planting practices are the target of the rule-making authority the Department of Agriculture seeks to exercise.

What is proposed in the rule is a fundamental change in farming practices followed by thousands of farmers. For more than 30 years, since long before the Government first established a cotton program, planting cotton by skipping rows has been an established practice in the Texas Panhandle and South Plains, as well as other areas.

Skip-row planting has been a good and common practice in our part of the country because it is a practice that makes the best use of available moisture. The roots of the cotton plants are able to reach out to benefit from the moisture in adjacent skipped rows.

It is a good and common farming practice because it permits sunlight to reach the sides of the plants, cutting down on boll rot and improving the quality of the fiber.

It is a good and common practice because it enables our farmers to prevent damaging wind erosion, which threatens in late winter and early spring. Farmers are able to plant rows of grain sorghum in the skipped rows and thus check the wind by rows of standing sorghum stalks. This is a practice strongly endorsed by the Soil Conservation Service.

It is a good and common practice because it permits so-called interplanting, by which a farmer on irrigated land may plant alternate four-row strips of cotton and grain sorghum to the benefit of the quality of both crops. Estimates are that this practice adds from \$6 to \$12 per bale in the quality of cotton lint and seed. The sorghum strips, by holding the heat, permit the cotton to mature earlier at higher grade.

It has also been tied closely to the Government grain sorghum program, enabling the farmer to count as diverted acres under the grain sorghum program the fallow four-row strips between four cotton rows. The effect of the proposed new rule, with its system of measurement, would force present four-four skip-row patterns into an impossible pattern of four rows of cotton and five of fallow—in order for the fallow to count as diverted grain sorghum land. Present four- and eight-row farm equipment is obviously not built to accommodate such a scheme. Grain people are convinced that the effect of the skip-row proposal would be to encourage increased production of grain sorghum by farmers who now work that crop in conjunction with cotton.

The Department must give extremely careful consideration to this potential consequence.

The skip-row rule constitutes another damaging blow to an already depressed segment of American agriculture. Cotton supports have declined in 3 years to bring a reduction, in effect, of 30 to 40 percent of cotton farmers' net income after production expenses. The so-called cost-price squeeze has a very real meaning for the American cotton farmer, who now must face one more threat to his survival. The new rules are also causing considerable consternation, as they should, in local communities whose economies are dependent upon the fate of

cotton farmers. The Commissioners Court of Childress County, Tex., for example, estimates that the imposition of the proposed rules would result in a \$1 million drop in income within the county.

By proposing rules such as this one, the Agriculture Department is seeking to attain the goal of a workable balance between supply and demand at the expense of thousands upon thousands of bankrupt cotton farmers and depressed economies in the communities which have served them. The full impact of trying to attain this balance is being visited upon that segment least able to absorb it.

In formulating the new rules, the Department of Agriculture is following a practice I find altogether too common in the departments and agencies of our Government. Instead of seeking a correction of what are viewed as problems by coming to the Congress to ask for new legislation, the departments seek first—in too many instances—to exercise their authority to make rules and regulations. They, in effect, are legislating, and by doing so are invading the ground granted to Congress by the Constitution. When rules are imposed, citizens by the millions are affected by regulations which their duly elected representatives had absolutely no part in formulating. In our system of Government, rulemaking authority should not be used to circumvent the expressed will of the Congress or to avoid the more time-consuming process of enacting legislation. When rulemaking authority is abused, the people can justifiably complain of rule by fiat, of power improperly exercised by unfeeling bureaucratic administrators. But action by the Congress, through legislation enacted into law, has the great strength of having been supported by majorities of representatives elected by the people.

In seeking the objective claimed for the proposed skip-row rule change, the Department has the alternative of coming to Congress for new cotton program legislation. The Department has as yet offered no proposals to the Congress affecting cotton, but when it does so it could very well incorporate into its request provisions that would make unnecessary any change in the skip-row planting rules.

The Department could, for example, make a strong case before the Congress for increasing the per-pound support payment on the domestic allotment for each farm, now placed at 4.35 cents per pound, to further encourage the voluntary cutback of cotton production. I am convinced that an increase of a cent a pound or more in this phase of the cotton program would result in a substantially higher degree of grower participation. This would have the effect of

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lowering Government cotton stocks, thereby cutting the cost of the cotton program.

I am convinced also that progress can be made, under renewed and more aggressive effort by the Department, to improve the cotton export picture.

All aspects of the matter deserve thorough and careful review, not only in the Department but also in the Congress. In this connection, I have joined with the distinguished chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from Texas, the Honorable GEORGE H. MAHON, to ask that the House Committee on Agriculture hold a public hearing to permit cotton growers to appear and protest the proposed action of the Department of Agriculture. With Congressman MAHON, I would join growers in appearing before the committee.

If the Department should follow through with the skip-row proposal and place the rule in effect, Congress must act to correct the situation. The proposed rule in punitive, defies sound agricultural practices, would destroy morale and confidence among farmers and rural people generally, and would threaten economic ruin for thousands and thousands of our farm families.

## The Profile of a Nonconformist

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, our distinguished Chaplain, Dr. Frederick Brown Harris, is rendering an important and much needed service to our Nation through the column he writes, which is published in the Sunday Star of Washington, D.C., and in various other newspapers around the country. I have been particularly impressed with several recent articles by Dr. Harris in which he has stressed the importance of individualism to our Nation, and has warned against the cult of conformity which appears to be engulfing America in so many aspects of life. In his article which was published in the Sunday Star of May 16, 1965, Dr. Harris has done an outstanding job of challenging Americans to be individualists and to dare to stand by their convictions, regardless of the pressures to conform. The article is entitled "The Profile of a Nonconformist." I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[May 16, 1965]

THE PROFILE OF A NONCONFORMIST  
(By Dr. Frederick Brown Harris, Chaplain,  
U.S. Senate)

The miracle of television has been etching for a vast audience the profiles of brave men who in public life could not be counted upon to conform. They refused to jump

through the partisan hoop even at the mandate of the majority. Such biographies are the inspiring tales of those who disregarded their political future by voting "no" instead of the demanded "yes", or vice versa. The narration of such deeds of untarnished honor is a legacy left by the martyred young President who, as he lay in the gloom of wartime wounds, heard nightingales singing in the dark.

In this age of mass production one is quite accustomed to gaze at the contented profiles of lock-step pedestrians who would never think of stepping out of the prescribed line. Theirs not to reason why—theirs but to stolidly acquiesce in being stamped with the accepted and expected brand of fashion, thought, usage, and custom. It cannot be denied that the vast majority just keep slavish step to the drumbeat of conformity. They seldom, if ever, explore the reason for the routine of their changeless ways. If questioned regarding their attitude the only explanation would be suggested by the phrase "Everybody's doing it."

In every pod of peas there is usually a string of duplicates, hence the expression, when measuring the characteristics of separate entities, strikingly similar, often is—"they are as alike as two peas in a pod." A pod of identical peas might well be included in any appropriate coat of arms for the second half of the 20th century.

If individualism was the prevailing feature of American life in the days gone by, standardization is certainly the dominant vogue now. Somebody thinks of setting an ad to a lively tune and immediately commercial houses, selling anything from food or filters to flights by planes, tune up to do the same thing.

And so from the radio comes each day a long line of giggly melodies. In more or less dulcet tones we are exhorted to wear the same kind of clothes, eat the same food, read the same kind of books, see the same type of movies, listen to the same kind of radio and TV programs, and alas the peas in a pod design extends also to what we say and what we think.

Robert Louis Stevenson once made a remark which suggests that he would think of this conforming day. He declared, "To do anything because others do it, and not because the thing is good, or kind, or honest in its own right, is to resign all moral control and the determination to be captain of yourself and go posthaste to the devil with the greatest number." Multitudes have gone to the devil, and with the devil, by simply taking the line of least resistance. A keen observer of our national habits and customs recently remarked, "In America speech and thought are so conditioned as to be for millions practically automatic, individuality of expression and independence of judgment are in danger of becoming lost arts. We have to reckon with the mass mind whose opinions are molded by the press, the films, the radio, the book clubs, and whose taste, standards, ambitions, and responses tend to be stereotyped."

Yet, in the face of all, it needs to be said that there can be no question that the great benefactors of the race have been nonconformists who refused to be just peas in a pod. They were men who stood alone, while the men they agonized for threw the contemptuous stone. The men upon whose brow a nation now puts a crown of gratitude as the Republic's Founding Fathers are first rebels. A rebel is one who steps out of a regimented line and refuses to conform. Pasteur, whose very name safeguards the daily bottles of milk at our doors, is an inspiring profile of a nonconformist. He refused to fit into the medical pea pod of his day. In America's history there have been men in the field of public office whose courageous vote in legislative halls, as they defied the majority, sent them to political oblivion but with their

integrity unsullied. Always the world's chosen heroes have been willing to pay the price of nonconformity by accepting criticism, ridicule, ostracism, and poverty, rather than to utter a spineless "Yes." What discipline of the will was suggested by the old hymn which was a tonic to youth in the yesterdays and whose lines were loaded with spiritual vitamins:

"Dare to be a Daniel,  
Dare to have a purpose true  
Dare to stand alone,  
And dare to make it known!"

Why have the names of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego lived in shining honor across so many centuries? It is because in spite of the decrees of a dictator when everybody else was bowing down to the golden image set up on the plain, these three immortal Hebrews stood up and, refusing to bow or bend, defied the tyrant by declaring—"We will not bow down."

St. Paul, in drawing the profile of a nonconformist, put it once for all when he wrote, "Be not conformed to this world but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind."

## Resolution Supporting the President of the United States

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 5, 1965

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, I place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the text of a resolution passed by the American Legion Irvington Post No. 38 in Indianapolis in support of President Johnson and his conduct of the crisis in Vietnam.

This resolution also was passed by the 11th District of the American Legion at its regular meeting May 6, 1965:

## RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES

"Whereas the free world is in constant hot and cold wars with communism for perpetual freedom; and

"Whereas the loss of freedom anywhere in the world is a loss of freedom everywhere; and

"Whereas freedom is in dire danger in South Vietnam in Asia; and

"Whereas the President of the United States is taking proper action necessary in that country to uphold and defend that freedom; and

"Whereas subversives, Communists, unwilling and appeasement-minded individuals in the United States and other non-Communist countries believe that aggressive Communists can be appeased; and

"Whereas these people are materially and psychologically helping the Communists by attempting to force the President of the United States into some form of negotiations, which course will add up to a disastrous defeat for the free world or force it into a nuclear war for survival; and

"Whereas in reality Communists are unreasonable, unworthy men, in deeds, words, broken treaties and never to be trusted in sincere negotiations; and

"Whereas President Johnson deserves, and should have, the full support of freemen everywhere; Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That Irvington Post No. 38, Department of Indiana, the American Legion, this 23d day of April 1965, in regular meeting assembled does hereby go on record as

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strongly supporting the President of the United States in his forceful policy in South Vietnam, thus disregarding the opinions of the above mentioned groups, but at the same time pursue such a firm policy as will negate the purposes of the Communists in obtaining their objectives by a premature cease-fire in South Vietnam, or by prolonged deliberations which practiced in Korea ended in great disadvantages for the United States; and be it further

*"Resolved.* That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the next regular meeting of the 11th District, Department of Indiana, of the American Legion for further favorable action, that copies be forwarded to the next Department executive meeting, the President of the United States, the 11th District congressional Representative in Congress, the two Senators from Indiana and the local press.

"This resolution unanimously passed as attested by

**"JULIUS MEININGER,  
"Commander.**

**"DON M. OWEN,  
"Adjutant."**

This resolution was passed by the 11th District of the American Legion at its regular meeting May 6, 1965.

**DWIGHT McCAGUE,**

**"Commander.**

**LOWELL B. STORY,  
"Adjutant.**

**Address by John M. Hosford on Presentation of 23d Annual Bellamy Award**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF**

**HON. JOSEPH D. TYDINGS**

**OF MARYLAND**

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES**

**Monday, May 17, 1965**

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an address delivered at the 23d annual Bellamy Award presentation, last year, by John Michael Hosford, the president of the Annapolis High School Student Council.

The Bellamy Award is in honor of Francis Bellamy, the author of the "Pledge of Allegiance," and is given each year to an outstanding high school.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**ADDRESS BY MIKE HOSFORD, ANNAPOLIS HIGH SCHOOL, ANNAPOLIS, MD.**

I feel that the endeavors of the students in school and in community lives are best expressed by the inscription above the Annapolis High School entrance: "The measure of a man is the depth of his convictions, the breadth of his interests, and the height of his ideals."

Annapolis, capital city, has played an important part in our Nation's history. In its State House, the oldest in the United States still in legislative use, George Washington resigned his commission as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. Annapolis is the home of the distinguished U.S. Naval Academy and of St. John's College where the author of our national anthem, Francis Scott Key, received his education.

Annapolis High School was founded in 1897. It consists of grades 10-12, and has an enrollment of 2,000. Its motto is "Knowledge is Power," and the panther is its emblem.

Our school supports an extensive athletic program. Our 1963 football team was first place in the county, as were the girl's hockey team and boy's soccer team, both undefeated. In lacrosse, an Indian game to which many of you probably have never been introduced, Annapolis High School is undefeated in 34 games over 4 years. We are rated first in the State, and as one of the finest teams in the country.

Our student council promotes and supports a large number of clubs, among them: the Booster Club, which maintains spirit and morale; the Junior Civitan Club, which is for young leaders in the community; and the American Field Service chapter, which sponsors our foreign exchange student, this year from Thailand.

Our school newspaper, Tally-Ho, was the first high school paper to take part in an exchange program with a foreign country, under a program sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency.

From Annapolis, I extend to you sincere congratulations, and I present a set of historical prints of our capital city, as a memento of your Bellamy award sister city.

**California's Manmade Agricultural Disaster**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

**OF**

**HON. CRAIG HOSMER**

**OF CALIFORNIA**

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**Monday, May 17, 1965**

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, over a month ago, on April 7, the Long Beach Independent-Press-Telegram editorially assessed the administration's refusal to permit Mexican labor to harvest California crops as unrealistic and a threat to the economic well-being of millions of citizens. As the weeks have passed since then the crisis has mounted to disaster proportions, all as predicted in the editorial, which read as follows:

**BRING BACK THE BRACERO**

Because Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz refuses to admit the realities of the farm labor problem in California, this State faces an agricultural crisis which can affect the economic well-being of millions of citizens.

The crisis stems from the expiration, last December, of the program under which Mexican farmworkers came to California to help harvest crops of fruits and vegetables.

It was and is the contention of Secretary Wirtz that domestic American labor is sufficient to do this work. Unfortunately, the need for farmworkers is not being met by domestic labor, with the result that agricultural production suffers.

Despite the end of the so-called bracero program, Secretary Wirtz has the power under Public Law 414, an immigration act, to let foreign workers enter this country temporarily. He has refused to exercise this power.

When the bracero program ended, he immediately slammed the door against further imports of farm labor. Growers couldn't get enough American workers to pick crops. In desperation, State employment director, Albert Tieburg asked Wirtz to authorize the use of 5,100 Mexican nationals in the vegetable fields. Governor Brown, himself, echoed the request. Wirtz merely answered that he was not satisfied that growers had

cooperated fully in recruiting farm help from the State's unemployed. About 10 days ago, after a tour of California farm areas, he criticized living quarters offered by some growers and declared that the farmers must just learn to live without the importation of Mexican nationals.

Meanwhile, fruit and vegetables rotted on the ground. Farmers began to curtail plantings because of the uncertainty of getting labor to do the harvest. Some canners were reported thinking about moving their operations to Mexico. The Bank of America announced it would not lend money to farmers to plant crops requiring stoop labor if there was no reasonable expectation of adequate labor to harvest crops.

Right now is the period of smallest need for harvest workers, and yet the farmers are having trouble. There has been a reported drop of approximately 40 percent in tomato plantings this year from last. If difficulties are encountered now, what will the problem be next September at the peak of operations?

Senator GEORGE MURPHY, who is leading the campaign to permit the importation of Mexican farmworkers, contends that the stubborn attitude of Secretary Wirtz is hurting small growers very seriously, driving agriculture to Mexico, and creating unemployment. Teamsters and longshoremen are suffering loss of work. Cutbacks in production of vegetables can eliminate the jobs of cannery workers and raise the prices which housewives must pay at the grocery store.

At the heart of Secretary Wirtz' opposition to the bracero program is the contention that it was a slave-labor program which exploited Mexican workers while denying jobs to California's unemployed. But columnist Caspar Weinberger recently pointed out:

"The Mexican workers signed up years in advance, hoping their names would be drawn so they could come to California to work. Their working, living, and traveling conditions were carefully regulated and improved by governmental and private agreements. And, most important of all, there never were anywhere near enough domestic workers willing to harvest the row crops that make up the staple of California agriculture."

The Department of Labor tried to recruit American workers but fell flat on its face. Willing domestic workers were found to be insufficient in quantity and quality; and when they did appear for work, they could not be depended upon to stay on the job. It was more rewarding to go on relief.

A point which Secretary Wirtz evades is that the law requires domestic labor to be hired before foreign workers are authorized. The bracero can be hired only in the absence of the domestic. Thus, it's not actually a question of putting willing American workers out of jobs.

During the bracero program, California growers used about 90,000 Mexicans and about 40,000 domestic workers. This offers some idea of the vacuum of labor which has been created.

Why did Mexicans clamor for the slave jobs on California farms? The answer is that in terms of the cost of living in Mexico, they were well paid. The bracero program was a happy situation for them, for Mexico, for the California growers, for the California economy, and for just about everybody—except Secretary Wirtz.

The experiment since last December has proven that domestics cannot or will not fill the needs of California growers; it has produced economic hardships; it promises further, more serious hardships. Therefore, the time has come for Secretary Wirtz to admit that the bracero is needed and to proceed with the negotiations necessary to assure his services for California growers. Further delay will cause irreparable damage.

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**Soviet Strength—Editorial by William J. Coughlin**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OR**

**HON. STROM THURMOND**

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the May 17 issue of *Missiles and Rockets* contains an editorial which discusses the Soviet military displays in the last few days and the meanings of the displays, in terms of U.S. military security. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial, entitled "Soviet Strength," be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**SOVIET STRENGTH**

(By William J. Coughlin)

The Soviet Union, with its May 9 display of missile and space might, has dealt a major blow to the complacency of those persons in the United States who consistently have underestimated the competence of the Russians in these fields.

The appearance of Soviet solid-fuel missiles of a type similar to the U.S. Minuteman ICBM indicates that the Soviets finally have overcome the chemical roadblock which until now has made possible the U.S. lead in solids. We predicted just such a development on this page last January (M/R, Jan. 11, p. 46).

The credit rests with former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. He did not fail to grasp the fact that the early unwieldy liquid-fueled Russian ICBMs were militarily and geopolitically unsatisfactory. The intensive Russian effort to grasp the technology of solids now has paid off.

In a film which the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times estimated to be at least 3 years old, the Soviets also displayed launches from an underground silo. The combination of these events suggests the Soviets now are in a position to rapidly close the missile gap with the United States to the point where it is of no consequence in military calculations. The gap was a deliberate gamble on the part of the Soviet Union during development of the solid ICBM.

This is not entirely a gloomy turn of events for the United States. Solid-fuel missiles and underground silos make it possible for the Soviets now to assume a second-strike posture in military confrontations with the West.

The administration's display of confidence in recent months in the less intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union on the world scene, may, in fact, stem from early knowledge of these developments. Construction of underground silos would be difficult to hide from the high-resolution cameras of U.S. reconnaissance satellites.

We should not forget, however, that an ominous interpretation also can be put on such activities. Underground silos make it possible to conceal first-strike preparation, something that was not possible with liquid-fueled aboveground missiles. The damage-limiting nature of silos also removes from a first-strike position the necessity of getting all missiles off in salvo.

The Soviets also displayed an intermediate-range missile unmatched in the Western arsenal. Mounted on a tracked carrier, this very mobile weapon was described as having

a range of 1,100 miles. It, too, was solid-fueled.

The nearest comparable U.S. missile is the Pershing, with only half the range. It appears that while the United States has been discussing the Mobile Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MMRBM), the Soviet Union has been building it.

In the film release, the Russians for the first time showed their antimissile missile in action. One sequence was of intercept of an ICBM.

Again, it must be remembered that the film probably was 3 years old. The Russian Defense Minister announced in October 1962 that the Soviets had solved the anti-ICBM problem and the Russian lead in the field was officially acknowledged in the United States about the same time.

Undoubtedly, the effort on anti-ICBM's is much further along at this time. There is a significant side effect to this work also. The chances are exceedingly good that Soviet ICBM's are quite sophisticated as to penetration aids. Most certainly, knowledge from the antimissile program would have been used in this fashion, just as the United States has made similar use of information from the Nike-X program.

Therefore, the requirement imposed on Nike-X becomes even more severe and must be taken into account in the decision as to whether and when it should go into production.

The Soviets also displayed a new radio-guided antitank missile which is of interest in view of United States difficulties in developing an entirely satisfactory missile in this field.

Films of submarine launchings of Polaris-type missiles also were shown, a clear warning that the Navy's ASW burden can be expected to increase.

There are two comments which might be made on the display of Soviet missile might. First, it indicates a growing confidence in the capability of their weapons—since they are unlikely to display weapons of dubious quality. Second, going along with the new second-strike posture, it indicates an increased Russian belief in the value of deterrence. As U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara has pointed out, a deterrent is of no value unless it is credible to the enemy. Therefore, it must be displayed. Despite some interpretations of the Russian show as warlike, this position on deterrence surely is to be welcomed, since deterrence is a defensive attitude.

The increasing Soviet confidence also is indicated in the space field. The Soviets let it be known more than a month in advance that their next space spectacular could be expected on May 9 (M/R, Apr. 5, p. 7). The launch of Lunik V obviously was right on schedule. The acknowledgment after launch but in advance of impact that its goal was a lunar soft landing also is a more realistic approach to space developments than previously shown.

This shift toward a franker attitude is supported by the open admission of the Zond II Mars probe failure by Soviet scientists attending the Space Exploration Symposium in Chicago on May 4.

At the same time, the Russians released more information on the Soviet space program at the Chicago meeting than heretofore.

All of this points toward greater maturity in both Soviet missile programs and Soviet space programs. The competition, therefore, is far keener than many persons in the United States have been willing to admit.

The conclusion is clear. The United States cannot afford to let down or it will be far outdistanced in areas which will continue to be vital to its national security and well-being for many, many years.

**Tribute to the People of Norway**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. ROLLAND REDLIN**

OF NORTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. REDLIN. Mr. Speaker, today, May 17, is an appropriate time to pay tribute to the people of Norway, for 151 years ago on this date the Norwegian Constitution was signed, creating a new nation oriented toward liberty and democracy.

In many parts of the United States—and particularly in my State of North Dakota—Americans of Norwegian extraction will commemorate this anniversary. They have reason to be proud, because the Norwegian Constitution was rooted in traditions of liberty and rule by law dating back eight centuries.

Independence for Norway came after a series of unions with Denmark and Sweden in which either one or the other of these nations held the upper hand. In the early part of the 19th century, the Norwegians reluctantly entered the Napoleonic wars on the side of Denmark, with Sweden on the opposite side. As hostilities came to an end, Denmark was forced to sign the Treaty of Kiel on January 14, 1814, ceding Norway to Sweden.

Not only were the Norwegian people unhappy about being used as a pawn in international politics, but so was Prince Christian Frederik, Danish Governor General in Norway, who felt that his hereditary rights to Norway had been signed away.

Upon the call of Prince Christian Frederik, a constituent assembly convened at Eidsvoll near Oslo on April 10, 1814, to draft a Constitution. Fifty-nine government officials, 37 farmers and 16 businessmen drafted the Constitution in 6 weeks, and it was approved and signed on May 17.

Unfortunately, Norway's sovereignty was short lived. When the assembly elected Prince Christian Frederik to be King of Norway, Sweden launched a military attack. After brief hostilities, the Convention of Moss was negotiated, establishing Norway and Sweden as separate kingdoms under one monarch, King Carl Johan, of Sweden. Not until 1905 did Norway become a completely independent nation.

Nevertheless, King Carl Johan recognized Norway's Constitution and it remained in force during the entire period. Today, although two-thirds of the articles have been amended, the chief features of the Constitution remain intact as the fundamental law of Norway.

Mr. Speaker, the development of democratic thought in Norway, although rooted in ancient national traditions, was also influenced by the U.S. Constitution and by thousands of letters from the steady stream of Norwegian emigrants to the United States.

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Their paths do not cross, but the policeman, the rabbi, and the waitress play roles in the night-after-night drama in which this great and exciting city becomes a place of fear for many.

In a city which has so much to please them, they become prisoners in their homes. They feel they cannot enjoy their parks, their streets, even their neighborhood shops.

## IN OTHER CITIES

City officials draw another picture. They argue—and show statistics to prove their point—that New York has no runaway crime, any more than any large city. FBI statistics for 1963, the most recent year for which they are complete, show the New York metropolitan area crime rate as 1,688.6 crimes per 100,000 population. Rates in other large cities, 2,935.4 Los Angeles-Long Beach; 2,195.1 Chicago; 1,781.8 Atlanta; 1,621.2 Washington.

New York still throbs with activity. It is a work place and play place for millions. It is the capital of finance, theater, arts, science, the place where far-reaching decisions are made. People still earn their living, shop, go to the theater, art galleries, department stores, hotels, night school, sports events, raise families, educate their children, and spend their lives with security and without unpleasant incidents.

Still—despite the statistics, despite the obvious vitality of the city—many New Yorkers are uneasy. While their fear may not necessarily be related to fact it is a real state of mind.

And it is one which says—no matter what contrary evidence is presented—that New York is in a crisis of violence.

If not, why must police ride the subways and patrol the station platforms?

Why must private citizens form vigilante groups?

## STEPS BY THE MAYOR

Why must women buy weapons, which are enjoying a brisk sale, to protect yourself against masher, thieves, and hoodlums?

When extraordinary steps to combat crime were taken by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, they may have been designed to calm public fear, but at the same time they had the effect of confirming suspicions that crime was reaching a critical stage.

The mayor early in April issued the order that put hundreds of uniformed police on subway trains and platforms during the high incidence crime hours of 8 p.m. to 4 a.m. Fifteen days later, the mayor said 500 patrolmen were immediately being put on street duty during the night and that by July 1, the Nation's biggest police force would be brought to a strength of 28,228—nearly twice that of a U.S. Army Infantry division.

"The days ahead will be days of open war—we against the criminals," the mayor said. "We are going to win. They are going to lose."

Such assurance may filter down to the people, but at this point there is anxiety, and it manifests itself in many ways:

Central Park, an 840-acre island of greenery and lagoons in the midst of the concrete city, becomes a no man's land. People do not stroll through it at night. They fear assault from toughs or dope addicts moving in from Harlem at the north edge of the park, or Puerto Ricans from the tenements sprinkled among luxury apartment buildings on Central Park west and Riverside Drive.

## LIFE IN TIMES SQUARE

Times Square, the garish symbol of New York night life, has its particular breed of creeps who come out of the woodwork at 2 a.m.—hustlers of all sorts, homosexuals, panders, whatnots.

Women who work at night—telephone operators, for example—get free taxi service home, paid for by the company. Women who clean offices in the skyscrapers band to-

gether for subway rides home, or also get taxi service.

Along some business streets—Fulton in Brooklyn, is typical—businessmen close their shops at 7 p.m., instead of 9 or 10, as they did for years.

Subway trains and stations are considered dangerous places. Serious crimes in the subways increased 41.4 percent in the first 3 months of 1965, compared with the like period in 1964—a total increase of 123.2 percent since 1963.

Taxi drivers keep doors locked at night, refuse to take passengers into certain areas, and campaign for the right to carry weapons. They also want protective shields between driver and passenger, and electronic alarms.

In many buildings, public housing as well as private, tenants are afraid to use the automatic elevators alone. In a typical middle income building off Broadway tenants have metal coverings on their doors, and at least two locks on each door. New buildings have TV equipment so, tenants can see who is calling, or so custodians can monitor corridors from a central control point.

As for subways, there are 4.6 million fares each work day. In 1964, there was an average of 30 reported crimes each day. Offenses ranged from stealing light bulbs to murder.

"Does this mean that the subways are really unsafe?" asks a transit authority administrator.

On the basis of statistics, no. But "how can you rely on statistics," asks Rabbi Schrage, who organized the Maccabees, a citizens patrol in Brooklyn. "Consider rape. How many mothers will go to the police and say a daughter has been accosted? They do not want to mark a daughter with a public stain. Who would want to marry the girl? But to me, as a rabbi, and to others, they come to discuss such troubles."

According to Gilbert Gels, sociology professor at California State College:

"Possibly 1 out of 10 crimes committed becomes known to the police; maybe 1 out of 20; perhaps 1 out of 100; or, if you would care to, you could easily defend the view that, for each 100,000 criminal acts committed, only 1 becomes known to the police."

## THE NEGRO ANGLE

Negroes have been blamed for crime. Statistically, they are involved in a disproportionate share of known crimes. Sociologists and criminologists say this is because Negroes have been subjected to discrimination and disadvantage in jobs, housing, and education.

But many people feel a new element has been added—wanton crime against whites for racial reasons.

A Westchester executive waiting for a subway in mid-Manhattan was accosted by two Negroes and offered no resistance. But the men beat him before taking his wallet, saying in effect that he was a white so-and-so. Other whites have been beaten and injured by Negroes in unprovoked attacks.

"There possibly is the element of frustration on the part of some northern Negroes," says a Negro writer, "in the sense that they have not had the real opportunity to put themselves to the test in civil rights action, as some southern Negroes have."

"Most robbers want to get the money and get away," says a detective. "Every second these guys spend beating somebody raises the risk of getting caught."

The detective's conclusion is that there was more than robbery at work in some recent cases: that racial frustration had entered the picture.

## FEARS FOR CHILDREN

A young mother living in Greenwich Village tells of a change that has bewildered her.

"I used to wheel my daughter, who is now 8, in Washington Square Park, when she was

a baby. Even then, there were odd people around but you'd very seldom experience anything nasty. Now, I won't take my little boy there. The men are drunk and coarse, and there is something very abnormal about it.

"Some of the things the men say to you are not being said to you as a woman, but as a white woman. I'm very depressed by this because I fight for civil rights. These people are the ones I want to help, but I can't honestly put down the feeling that they have something against me because I'm white."

On racially inspired viciousness in crime, a spokesman for the New York City Police Department says: "There is no way in which this could be determined with any precision or accuracy, but we doubt it very much. Criminals do vicious things."

Certain crimes may occur infrequently, but when they do they get dramatic treatment. The stabbing of Jill Neiter, 24, in a 75-cent robbery, for example, produced a photograph of the girl sitting in an automobile with the mother-of-pearl handle of a switch-blade knife protruding from her back. On several occasions, gangs of young Negroes systematically harassed, beat and robbed passengers on subway trains. These incidents remain imbedded in the public mind.

"The fact is that Negro versus white crime is exaggerated," says an executive of a national Negro organization. "There is no disputing the fact the 9 out of 10 crimes committed by Negroes are against other Negroes, especially in murder, robbery, and rape."

"In the white press, Negroes are frequently victimized by misrepresentation, such as the case in which a married woman was beaten by her boy friend, and reported that it was done by a Negro in order to conceal that she'd been cheating on her husband."

## WORK WITH TEENAGERS

As for the element of a Negro compulsion to strike out against whites, he says:

"Of course, you get pushed around for generations, and the time comes for pushing back. If you're antisocial or a sociopath, then the race part will enter into it."

A Negro who does volunteer work with Negro teenagers says:

"I notice there is some of that feeling among the gang kids. It's not just that they're interested in bopping (fighting) with Italians or Puerto Ricans, but that now it also means getting back at whitey. The soul brothers (Negroes) have the sort of feeling that now is the time to act against whitey and you have to do it every which way."

This coincides with the notion that some northern Negroes are striking out because the brunt of the civil rights action is being carried by Negroes in the South.

"You get some people who think that because they mug some white person or steal something from a white person that they are being part of this big revolution," says one Negro. "They are not, but in a crazy way it gives them a way to rationalize mugging and robbing."

The immediate reaction to posting of police in potential problem areas was enthusiastic. Subway passengers remarked that they felt a lot better.

"I feel I can close my eyes and grab some sleep for the first time in years," says one man.

"Having more people together is better," says a woman. "This way you don't feel so much that you can go rattling around by yourself in some end of the train." (At night, fewer cars in each train are open to passengers.)

"To tell the truth, the police on the subway is a very good thing," says a 65-year-old Washington Heights woman, "but for how long will it be? If you have a situation somewhere else in the city, a riot of some

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kind of other troubles, they will take these police.

"But anyway, these little bums do not worry so much about the police. For them, it is a game. The policeman only makes it a harder game. But wait and see, they'll do some mugging again, believe me, even with the police."

It is with this cynicism and foreboding that the city moves toward summer. Already, there is the atmosphere of perhaps trouble worse than last summer's riots in Harlem, or subway harassment. One clue is in the growing talk about vigilante groups.

"I have been approached by influential persons about forming a citywide citizens patrol patterned on the Maccabees," says Rabbi Schrage, who started the Maccabees a year ago. Its original members were ultra-orthodox Jews, but it now is interreligious and interracial. It is credited with a substantial reduction in crime in Brooklyn's Crown Heights area.

"Who can say what it will be," says the rabbi, "but we must never stop, or it will get out of hand again."

**President Johnson Understands the Stakes in Southeast Asia**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. JACK BROOKS**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, television station WTOP in Washington recently dispatched Jack Jurey to Vietnam to report on the situation there. His editorials are truly fine illustrations of outstanding journalism.

These editorials point out that it is not a pleasant task the United States undertakes in southeast Asia. However, it is a necessary task.

President Johnson understands the stakes in southeast Asia. He knows that if communism is to be halted, we must draw the line somewhere. In defending freedom in Vietnam, President Johnson is defending our national honor and the honor of the entire free world.

So at this time, I salute the resolute determination of our great President as well as the fine editorial work of WTOP.

The text of three of Mr. Jurey's editorials follow:

[Editorial broadcast on May 11 and 12, 1965, over WTOP radio and television]

This is a WTOP editorial from Saigon.

During the next several days, WTOP will discuss the American involvement in Vietnam from this vantage point. The conclusions are based on first-hand observations of the U.S. military effort both in the north, at Danang, and in the Mekong Delta to the south, plus numerous off-the-record and background interviews with American and Vietnamese officials, including Prime Minister Quat.

What appears to us to be clearcut here in Saigon is that the U.S. position in South Vietnam is justified by hard fact. It is possible to argue by abstraction—as some do—that our country should not have allowed itself to become deeply enmeshed in this war in southeast Asia. Yet our commitment here is not the product of any one President, any one administration, or any one incident or episode. It has been forced upon us by

two basic factors. One is the imperative need to make a stand somewhere, somehow against the political and military ambitions of North Vietnam and Communist China. The second is the obligation to protect those South Vietnamese who have actively and openly supported us. To quit now, to give the Vietcong control of South Vietnam, would be to throw these men and women to the wolves.

These circumstances compel the United States to remain on its present course. South Vietnam may not be the best place to draw the line in southeast Asia, but there are worse places. The threat of further escalation continues, but that threat appears no more dangerous than the consequences of craven conciliation.

This station previously has supported the thrust of U.S. policy in Vietnam. We have now viewed the situation at firsthand. Our belief is reinforced that there is no acceptable alternative to present action. We cannot see how any retreat from the present policy could possibly do anything but work against American national interests.

This was a WTOP editorial, Jack Jurey speaking for WTOP from Saigon.

[Editorial broadcast on May 12 and 13, 1965, over WTOP radio and television]

This is a WTOP editorial from Saigon.

Discussing the ugly, uncertain war in South Vietnam, there seems to us to be both an official and unofficial failure to emphasize one aspect clearly enough. That is the extreme likelihood that, having entered into this struggle, the United States will be unable to withdraw from it for a considerable number of years.

If there are no negotiations, if the Vietcong continues its harassment of South Vietnam at about the present level, our country will have to maintain a military and political effort of very substantial magnitude involving the assignment of troops and the spending of large sums of money.

If on the other hand there is a Communist willingness to negotiate an end to the fighting, even then we are not home free. Because even if the shooting stops, the South Vietnamese will need a great deal of help to combat political subversion—help which will include massive economic development and the creation of a central government able to exercise effective control over a nation many of whose people are so isolated in various villages and hamlets that they don't know what's happening over the next hill.

Provided the military situation remains about as it is, with Vietcong units roaming a good deal of the countryside, nobody knows how long victory will take. We've heard estimates here ranging from 2 years to 10 years or more. Even when peace comes, a good many years will be required before the United States could withdraw totally.

Since Americans tend to want to deal with their troubles in haste, the prospect of a prolonged involvement in South Vietnam might be used by the opponents of that involvement. But now that we're in, we cannot get out quickly. And we should not want to get out until South Vietnam is a free, viable nation able to take advantage of its vast potential. Fate seems to have selected South Vietnam as the place in Southeast Asia where the United States has been forced to make one of its most difficult commitments. That commitment is going to be with us for a long time.

This was a WTOP editorial, Jack Jurey speaking for WTOP from Saigon.

[Editorial broadcast on May 13 and 14, 1965, over WTOP radio and television]

This is a WTOP editorial from Saigon.

In this city, each American has a vague but constant apprehension about the possibility of Communist terrorism. To the

north, around the base at Danang, Marine patrols expanding the perimeter come under sniper fire daily, with daily casualties. To the south, in the rich and crucial Mekong River Delta, Vietcong snipers are still active. Throughout South Vietnam, in all areas, Americans—including more than 100 women here in Saigon—are enduring danger and discomfort. Our military men, trained for a Western war, find themselves engaged in a guerrilla conflict in which the enemy is skilled and elusive, where there are no fixed battlelines and where the opponent is frequently a farmer by day and a fighter by night. The American advisers to the Vietnamese work patiently, often in isolated areas, to teach a variety of skills. What is underway in South Vietnam is an American effort in which military, political, and economic aspects are bewilderingly intertwined. There's been nothing quite like it in all our history.

But the Americans on duty here—about 37,000 at the last count—are conducting themselves admirably in the most difficult circumstances. Even the most fleeting visitor cannot avoid being deeply impressed with their dedication and with their willingness to try to cope with circumstances far outside their experience. It is a fact that among the American advisers, for example, a genuine affection is being created for the often hapless Vietnamese. Among American officers attached to Vietnamese units, there is a real feeling that the South Vietnam soldier can become an excellent fighting man if only he is given the proper training and leadership.

This is no small thing, this effort by Americans in South Vietnam to adjust themselves to strange and dangerous circumstances with good grace and good will. Because in the end, the war here will not be won by Americans, it will be won by the South Vietnamese themselves. And no matter how long and difficult this ugly struggle may be, the American presence here is remarkable for its quality.

This was a WTOP editorial, Jack Jurey speaking for WTOP from Saigon.

**Results of Questionnaire, 12th Congressional District of Illinois**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. ROBERT McCLORY**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, recently I circulated a public opinion questionnaire to more than 127,000 households in the 12th District of Illinois—comprising Lake, McHenry, and Boone Counties. It is gratifying to report that over 17,000 questionnaires were returned, many with additional comments and suggestions.

It has been most helpful to me in my work to review these questionnaires and to read the numerous individual opinions expressed by the well-informed and vitally interested citizens of our 12th Congressional District. I am pleased to include the compiled results of this poll in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, as follows:

**THE 1965 QUESTIONNAIRE—FINAL RESULTS**

1. Because the Nation's growing need for coins cannot be met by the two existing U.S. mints at Philadelphia and Denver, I introduced H.R. 39 to construct a third U.S. mint

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a giant metaphor of man's attempt at self-government—the highest form of poetic expression—and demanding the highest form of human interpretation.

Thomas Jefferson was perhaps one of the greatest thinkers ever to occupy the White House. For years he had been teaching—nay, preaching—that the Constitution was subject only to the narrowest, strictest, most literal interpretations. Unexpectedly, however, the French Emperor Napoleon offered to sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States for a few million dollars. Now, the Constitution did not specifically state that the Federal Government had any right to purchase territory from another nation. Should Thomas Jefferson risk his popularity and the next election, to purchase land yet unexplored whose boundaries were uncharted? Should Thomas Jefferson go back on his statements and beliefs of the past regarding strict constitutional interpretations, just to buy Louisiana? Should he? Could he? Dare he?

Knowing that Napoleon might change his mind, knowing that time was short, knowing that the future of his Nation hung in the balance, Jefferson abandoned his ideas of strict interpretation and adopted the great concept of implied powers. Jefferson reasoned that the Constitution empowered the Federal Government to make war and treaties—therefore, it implies the power to acquire territory, because often that is a result of wars and treaties. By adopting a new interpretation, Jefferson more than doubled the size of America.

The eminent historian Charles A. Beard has given an economic interpretation to the Constitution. He claims that, "The Constitution was essentially an economic document based upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of property are \* \* \* morally beyond the reach of popular majorities."

Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, in interpreting the first amendment, has said of the clause barring the establishment of a state religion, "Its first and most immediate purpose rested on a belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion."

Here are but three interpretations of our national poem: The Constitution as seen by Jefferson, Historian Beard, and Justice Black. Why interpretations? Because as someone has said, a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged. It is a skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used. If we said that the Constitution was not subject to change, not subject to discussion, and not subject to interpretation, our society would crumble like dry spice cake, because examination of ideas and the interpretation of those ideas are necessary for a vigorous society. When we say that the Constitution is so sacrosanct—so sacred—it needs no reevaluating. When we say that there is only one interpretation to the Constitution, and all others are null and void; we are destroying the very things upon which this society was founded: free discussion, free minds, and free men.

If the Founding Fathers had taken the attitude that the Constitution was perfect and needed no reevaluation and interpretation as years wore on, there would have been no Bill of Rights—the first 10 amendments—no outlawing of slavery, and men and women of all races would not have the right to vote, much less be free. Only 100 years ago was citizenship even defined in the Constitution. Only 45 years ago could women universally cast ballots. And only last November were residents in the District of Columbia allowed to vote for President. The Constitution is never perfect.

"We are the hollow men—We are the stuffed men  
Leaning together headpiece filled with straw.  
Alas!  
Our dried voices, when we whisper together,  
Are quiet and meaningless as wind in dry grass  
Or rats' feet over broken glass in our dry cellar.  
Shape without form, shade without color,  
Paralyzed force, gesture without motion."

I don't know how you interpret those words of T. S. Eliot, or how you interpret the Constitution, but I do know that tonight I could have talked to you on many things about the Constitution we all know to be true. But when we pacify we rarely provoke. And sometimes, when we whisper together, our voices are meaningless and we are hollow.

Only when you and I question, examine, and interpret the Constitution for ourselves and to our times, as the Founding Fathers intended, do we become not hollow men, empty of intellectual vigor, but men and women worthy of our national poem, the U.S. Constitution.

May we always interpret it, various as those interpretations may be, so that our Constitution will not become hollow, empty, and meaningless; and greater still, so that we will not become hollow men, headpiece filled with straw. Let us be honest men, seeking an honest approach to a constitutional interpretation for the problems of our day.

## Vet "War Against War"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

## HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. DERWINSKI. The past weekend academic critics of the President's strong stand in the face of Communist aggression in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic had a field day in the denunciation of U.S. actions.

Therefore it is necessary for us to re-emphasize that the vast majority of the American public support the President in his present position.

An especially effective editorial appeared in Chicago's American, Friday, May 14, which I place in the RECORD at this point.

## VIET "WAR AGAINST WAR"

President Johnson's televised address on foreign policy yesterday contained little that was new, but it restated a fact that will probably need restating many times: That the Communist aggression in Vietnam is just not going to succeed, however long it continues, and the sooner its leaders give it up the sooner they can start rebuilding their country toward a wholly reasonable goal or prosperity.

This appears to be the basis of American policy in southeast Asia, and we believe it's the strongest one possible. The United States is not trying to win a war by ordinary standards of annexing territory or imposing its will on a beaten government. Such a victory would be meaningless. Our goal is to provide a point that is very likely the most important in the world today: That war itself no longer works. Our battle in Vietnam is meant to establish that fact beyond doubt;

to discredit war permanently as an instrument of policy.

This is what makes the cries of the sur-render-now brigade so incomprehensible. In effect, the "peace" demonstrators are demanding that we prove before the world that war does work—that Communist powers can start new wars with fair confidence that we'll eventually let them win. It's no wonder the Chinese Reds quote them so approvingly; they've been saying the same thing.

Johnson also enlarged on his April proposal for a cooperative economic aid program for southeast Asia. He said the United States was "prepared to participate in and support an Asian development bank to help finance economic progress," and invited other industrialized nations—specifically including the Soviet Union—to take part.

This idea plainly is designed to do several things besides making peace look more attractive to North Vietnam. It offers Russia a way to increase its influence in southeast Asia at China's expense; it offers the Hanoi Government increased independence from the Chinese; and it would help spread our burden of responsibility for southeast Asia.

It would also, no doubt, cost huge amounts of money. But we doubt that there's any solution that wouldn't do that.

## Polish Constitution Day

## SPEECH

OF

## HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 3, 1965

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, we all know that a spirit of freedom is possessed by many men who live under tyranny. The flame never ceases to burn although its light may be dimmed to protect those who gather hope from the smallest ray of light.

This may somewhat describe the plight of freedom loving people in Poland. The spirit of freedom lives on though it may of necessity be dimmed. It is, nonetheless, a source of encouragement to those who continue to be hopeful that one day this land may once again be free.

On May 3, the people of Poland and Americans whose ancestors or who themselves may have come from that great land celebrate Constitution Day, on this date in 1791 the Polish Diet, or Parliament, ratified a new constitution which established constitutional democracy under cabinet government in Poland.

I was privileged to be in attendance at a ceremony sponsored by the Polish American Citizens Club in Bayonne, commemorating Polish Constitution Day. Speakers recalled from history the names of Poles who fought for freedom not only in their native land but on the side of freedom with the American colonists in 1776. All Americans continue to be inspired by the spirit and deeds of the legendary heroes of the American revolution which included Generals Pulaski and Kosciusko.

As we spoke of these great men, I was mindful that in our city were two Amer-

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icans of Polish ancestry who were recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor awarded for valor in combat in World War II—Stephen Gregg and Nicholas Oresko. The people of Bayonne are proud of these modern day heroes who yourselves are part of the great nation of American and grateful for the service they rendered our country.

We should be ever mindful that many thousands of Polish-Americans fought in World War II, in Korea and are now serving in our Armed Forces. They too follow the pathway of freedom blazed by Pulaski and Kosciusko.

We are mindful that thousands of free Poles fought with the allied forces in Europe.

We acknowledge the great contributions made by Poles in every profession to the building of America. We are aware of the role of the Polish American community to the civic, culture, business, and political activities of this country. We are inspired and encouraged by their great accomplishments.

Polish Constitution Day is their day to recall the sacrifices that have been made for freedom in Poland and to rededicate themselves to the proposition that one day all men will be free.

## Norwegian Constitution Day for 1965

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

**HON. THOMAS M. PELLY**

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 13, 1965

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, a century and one-half ago, on May 17, 1814, the Norwegian Constitution was signed at Eidsvold Mansion, north of Oslo. The Constitution was the work of a small group of patriots who were concerned lest Norway become the victim of great power intrigues toward the end of the Napoleonic wars. Ever since the end of the 14th century, Norway had been united with Denmark under one sovereign and ruled by Danish officials. In the Kiel Treaty of January 14, 1814, Denmark was forced to cede Norway to Sweden without Norway's consent. Norwegians immediately protested what they regarded as an infringement of their right to decide their own future. Even the Danish Royal Governor in Norway, Prince Christian Frederik, was incensed by the transaction.

Hoping to proclaim Norway an independent kingdom with himself as king, Prince Christian Frederik called a constitutional assembly to draw up a constitution for an independent Norway. In a little over a month, the work of the assembly was completed. The constitution that was proclaimed on May 17, 1814, was one of the most liberal of the time. It reflected the influence of British political traditions, as well as the principles embodied in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the ideas of the French Revolution. Although Norway

was subsequently forced to accept union with Sweden as a separate kingdom under the Swedish crown, the constitution was allowed to stand. Today, that constitution, with its guarantees for the rights and liberties of citizens, still provides the framework for the Government of Norway.

Norwegians are justly proud of the achievements of the men of Eidsvold, and of the content and longevity of their constitution. The 17th of May is a national holiday in Norway. It is celebrated not with displays of armed might as is customary in so many other nations on the occasion of national holidays. It is celebrated with parades composed largely of children dressed in colorful costumes. For Norwegians are a peace-loving people. They place their hopes for the future in their children. They believe that their children should learn to cherish principles and ideals embodied in the Norwegian Constitution.

Norwegian-Americans, descendants of almost a million Norwegians who have come to this country in the past century, also celebrate the 17th of May. And rightly so. For they well see that the principles enshrined in the Norwegian Constitution provide a strong link between their land of origin and their adopted country. A solid respect for fundamental human rights, a continuing concern for the well-being of fellow citizens, and a profound attachment to responsible government, are shared by Norwegians and Americans. It seems only natural that Norwegians and Americans should stand together in many international settings to further mutual goals of peace and progress throughout the world.

Today therefore, I would like not only to salute our Norwegian friends and my fellow citizens of Norwegian descent on a day that they both hold dear. I would also like to pay homage to the principles that are enshrined in both the Norwegian Constitution and the Constitution of the United States of America. I would like to celebrate the friendly relations of more than a century and one-half between Norway and the United States.

## Performance: The Best Test

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

**HON. RICHARD T. HANNA**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 17, 1965

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, a number of bills have been introduced in this session of Congress which have as their intent the substantial reorganization of our present system for regulating the banking industry. While recognizing that the present system does have its limitations, as do all human institutions, and while recognizing the well meaning intent behind those proposals, I think that it would be well to step back, reflect a bit, and ask some hard questions about the need for such changes. I believe

that we can all agree that few things are more important to the growth and overall health of our economy than a well-run banking industry regulated in the public interest. Moreover, the relationship of these factors to each other is all important. To illustrate that relationship, let us for a moment compare the economy to a modern internal combustion engine. Using such a metaphor, we can easily visualize finance as the fuel which that engine needs to keep running, the banking industry as the system which brings the fuel to the engine and regulation as the carburetor which controls the flow of the financial fuel to the engine. If the engine is to function smoothly, the carburetor must be carefully and finely adjusted to be in tune with the engine and to allow just the right amount of fuel to flow into the cylinders.

Now like the best engineered carburetors, the regulatory mechanism is a human creation; it is therefore not perfect and may require some readjustment from time to time when and if the engine starts to run a little rough. But such an adjustment must be undertaken only with the greatest of care. Too radical a turn of the screw in one direction, even by a hand with the best of motives guiding it, will result in flooding the engine. Conversely, a violent twist in the opposite direction will choke off the entire fuel supply. The result in both cases is the same: the engine dies. Now, the better the engine is running, the finer and less radical the adjustment need be. Right now, Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that the engine of our economy is performing in a superior fashion. To me that indicates that our regulatory mechanism is in excellent shape and is well tuned to the economy. While conceding the possibility of a need for a very minor adjustment or two, in no case do I now see the need for a major overhaul of a perfectly good carburetor.

Moreover, Mr. Speaker, those who suggest completely replacing the present carburetor with a new one are going to have to show us that the engine will run better than it now does because of it. That is the criterion. Yes, a new carburetor may be and in itself be more streamlined; it might be more efficient; it might even be atomic powered. But is that what we need for our particular engine at this particular time? Will the new carburetor be better tuned to the engine than the present one now is? Will the engine run better? Again, Mr. Speaker, considering how well the engine is now performing, unless these mechanical engineering experts have some very convincing laboratory test arguments, we can ill afford to give them a road test at this time.

Along these lines, Mr. Speaker, I would like to introduce into the RECORD and urge every Member of Congress to read, an editorial which appeared in a recent edition of the American Banker and which is based on the remarks of the Comptroller of the Currency, Mr. James J. Saxon, made before the Banking and Currency Committee on which I have the privilege of serving. The editorial asks some hard questions of those who would